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BACKDOOR EUGENICS: THE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS
OF CERTAIN DAMAGES AWARDS IN WRONGFUL BIRTH AND
WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIMS
∗

Jillian T. Stein
I.

INTRODUCTION

Wrongful birth and wrongful life actions are unlike other prenatal torts because of such lawsuits’ discriminatory treatment of the
disabled. When a state recognizes such causes of action without limitation or restrictions on damages awards, the state is engaging in eu1
2
genics. In other prenatal torts, such as prenatal-injury tort actions
3
and wrongful pregnancy (i.e., wrongful conception), value judgments are not made by the courts. When a state recognizes prenatal∗
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1
Generally, “eugenics” is defined as “a science that deals with the improvement
(as by control of human mating) of hereditary qualities of a race or breed,” MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 399 (10th ed. 1998), or “[t]he improvement of
the race by scientific controls, based on study of hereditary factors.” BALLENTINE’S
LAW DICTIONARY 423 (3d ed. 1969); see also GERRY W. BEYER & KENNETH R. REDDEN,
MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 297 (2d ed. 1996) (defining eugenics
as the “[d]eliberate manipulation of reproduction with the purpose of creating superior offspring”); infra Part IV.
2
In prenatal-injury torts, the doctor’s negligence causes the fetus to suffer some
harm in utero—that but for the doctor’s negligence, the child would have been born
“with a sound mind and body.” Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960). In
prenatal-injury tort actions, physicians have been held liable for disabilities caused by
their negligence connected with the birth itself. Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670,
674–75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). The wrongful birth tort, however, often involves a
negligent failure of the physician during the early stages of pregnancy to inform parents of the risks of certain birth defects. Id. at 675.
3
In wrongful pregnancy, the doctor’s negligent failure to detect a pregnancy
leads to the birth of an unwanted but healthy child. See Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 676.
In a wrongful pregnancy suit, when a physician negligently fails to detect a pregnancy, he deprives the mother of an opportunity to terminate the pregnancy at an early
stage, and “the birth of a healthy, but unwanted, baby results.” Id. (emphasis added).
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injury tort actions, the state does not condone the choice that a parent claims that he or she would have made to prevent the birth of a
disabled child—in prenatal-injury tort actions, “the intermediate step
4
of parental action” is not present. In wrongful pregnancy actions,
value judgments are not made about which babies should be born
but which ones should not. Granting damages in wrongful pregnancy actions (or wrongful conception actions) for the deprivation of the
opportunity to not have any child at all does not share the eugenic
implications of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions in that the
courts are not making value judgments through the juxtaposition of
the lives of disabled children with the lives of nondisabled children.
Courts in wrongful pregnancy actions acknowledge that the parents have lost an opportunity to make an informed decision not to
have a child. In wrongful birth and wrongful life cases, however, the
fact pattern is different. In wrongful birth cases, courts acknowledge
not merely the lost opportunity to choose, but consider parents to be
“damaged” as a result of their lost opportunity to choose, specifically,
not to have a disabled child. And in wrongful life actions, courts find
disabled children to be “damaged” in having been born because had
the parents been given a choice, the pregnancy would have been aborted and that, allegedly, would be preferable to the disabled children. Therefore, by recognizing the torts of wrongful life and wrongful birth, the state condones the value judgments made by parents.
This condonation has both discriminatory and eugenic implications.
Discrimination is inherent when a court or legislature chooses to
allow certain damages awards when the child is disabled (in wrongful
5
birth and wrongful life suits) but disallows the same damages when
the child is healthy although just as “unwanted” (as in wrongful
6
pregnancy and wrongful conception cases). This is especially true
when the unwanted birth arises from very similar circumstances—
when the birth arises out of a prenatal-care physician’s negligence
that deprived the parents of their ability to exercise their right to
choose. A finding that a parent has been harmed by having a dis-

4

Id. at 675. The allegation that the negligence of the physician robbed the parents of their opportunity to terminate the pregnancy is not present in prenatal-injury
tort actions as it is in wrongful birth. Id. Parents in wrongful birth cases have a right
to an abortion “but argue that the physician’s negligence deprived them of . . .
[their] right under controlling federal precedent to terminate a pregnancy.” Id. at
676.
5
See infra Part III.
6
See supra note 3.
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abled child she did not want but not so finding when the parent had
a healthy child she did not want is, in effect, discriminatory. Granting
additional damages to a disabled child in a wrongful-life suit but refusing to grant the same damages when the child is healthy is also inherently discriminatory.
Such discrimination has adverse effects. Initially, it stigmatizes
the disabled community by implying that parents and disabled children are harmed by the deprivation of the free exercise of procreative
choice when a birth results in a disabled child but not when a birth
results in a healthy child. Further, the legal recognition of wrongful
birth and wrongful life suits will pressure parents to make the decision not to birth a disabled child and will incentivize prenatal-care
7
doctors to advise against the same.
Although both wrongful birth and wrongful life suits have eu8
genic implications, this Comment argues that such suits should nevertheless be permitted. First, parents have a well-recognized right to
9
choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. Second, the law
would be an instrument of injustice if it left parents and disabled
children with the heavy burden of medical and other costs incurred
as a result of the deprivation of the parents’ right to choose when
that deprivation is the fault of the physician. The eugenic implications of these suits could be combated, however, by changing the type
of damages awarded and limiting the extent to which emotionaldistress damages can be awarded.
Part II of this Comment describes the right of procreative choice
and the motivating factors that form the basis of parents’ procreative
decisions. The differences between wrongful birth and wrongful life
causes of actions and the extent to which each tort has been recognized in this country are explained in Part III. Part IV of this Comment defines eugenics in detail. The eugenic implications of states
awarding plaintiffs damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits
are laid out in Part V. In Part VI this Comment proposes how states
can both appreciate the parents’ loss of their right to choose and mitigate the eugenic implications of these causes of action through the
restriction of damages awards. This Comment argues that, absent an
adequate health care system for disabled children and adults, every
7

See infra Part V.
See Glenn McGee & David Magnus, Eugenics, Ethics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 199, 203 (Thomas H. Murray &
Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000).
9
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973).
8
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state should grant awards of special damages in wrongful birth and
wrongful life causes of action and limit damages awards for emotional
distress. This Comment also proposes that, even if a proper health
care system were in place, the wrongful birth tort should be maintained and nominal damages should be awarded in recognition of
the resultant injury to parents when a negligent physician deprives
them of the opportunity to exercise their right to terminate a pregnancy. This Comment concludes that wrongful birth and wrongful
life suits should thus be remedied to prevent a new eugenics era and
ensure that history does not repeat itself in a profoundly negative
way.
II. MAKING CHOICES
A. The Right to Procreative Choice
The right to choose whether to conceive or to terminate a pregnancy, or even to avoid the birth of a disabled child, is grounded in
the right of privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
10
Amendment, which protects every person’s right to liberty. Every
fundamental right that comprises the broad right to privacy is consti11
tutionally protected from invasion by the states. The right to liberty
protects a person’s decisions from unjustified interference by the
12
government. Such decisions include personal decisions relating to
13
procreation. The Supreme Court of the United States has intimated
that the right to procreative autonomy is constitutionally protected
even though it is “not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, [is]
not intended by the framers, and [is] not part of tradition stated at
14
the most specific level of abstraction.” What must logically follow
10

In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court of the United States articulated that procreative autonomy is part of a right of privacy. See 381 U.S. 479, 484–
85 (1965). Originally, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, expressly rejected the contention that the right to privacy was protected in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 480–82. Instead, Justice Douglas
found the right of privacy in the penumbras of the guarantees specified in the Bill of
Rights. See id. at 484–85. Subsequent decisions, however, have placed the right of
privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
11
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–47.
12
See id. at 859.
13
Id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973).
14
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 827 (3d ed.
2006).
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from the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutio15
nality of a woman’s decision to have an abortion is the acknowledgment of “‘the right to submit to a procedure designed to give infor16
mation about that fetus which can then lead to a decision to abort.’”
Arguably, however, choosing and selecting the characteristics and
genetic makeup of a child should not be considered an entitlement
in light of the eugenic implications in making such choices.
Possibly, a person’s access to prenatal screening and abortions
should be limited because the use of these procedures may lead to
the eradication of one particular group of people—genetically im17
paired individuals.
In a democratic government, however, the
18
“democratic presumption” provides that government should not in19
terfere with a person’s freedom absent sufficient justification. The
presumption is that every person should be able to live as he or she
may choose based on one’s own moral code and values regardless of
20
whether such choices and values are mainstream. The freedom to
do something cannot be limited to the freedom to do what is agreeable to everyone. Reproductive freedom is most important when it is
21
the freedom to do what is disagreeable to others; otherwise that
freedom is meaningless. Only when a person’s choice poses serious
danger to someone else or to society should the state intercede and
22
limit this freedom of choice. Anything that falls short of this justifi23
cation for interference will kill liberty.
Although some risks of harm may warrant interference with procreative choice, whether the risk of stigma to the disabled community
warrants such interference is not so clear. Proponents of the demo15

In 1973 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, concluded that the “right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 410 U.S. at 153.
16
LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT GENETICS 58
(2001) (quoting Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff’d
without opinion sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990)).
17
See JOHN HARRIS, ENHANCING EVOLUTION: THE ETHICAL CASE FOR MAKING BETTER
PEOPLE 72 (2007).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 76.
22
Id. at 72.
23
HARRIS, supra note 17, at 72.
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cratic presumption argue that to rebut this presumption, the risks of
24
harm must be “real and present, not future and speculative.” If the
risks are speculative in nature, “the presumption in favor of liberty
would be at risk whenever imaginative tyrants could postulate possi25
ble, but highly unlikely, future harms.” The risk of stigma to and
the elimination of persons with genetic disabilities is not speculative,
26
but rather is a very real and likely harm. Nevertheless, the right to
choose whether to have a child is afforded strong protection.
27
The mere exercise of personal preference is distinguishable
28
from the right to reproductive liberty and procreative autonomy.
Consequently, the former does not deserve as much protection as the
latter:
If freedom to choose [a good] is simply something that we all
want, like air conditioning or lobsters, then we are not entitled to
hang on to these freedoms in the face of what we concede to be
29
the rights of others to an equal share of respect and resources.

By contrast, courts protect a person’s right to reproductive liberty
and procreative autonomy. The person deprived of the right to
choose may seek legal redress against the negligent tortfeasor.
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits are two avenues of such relief.
B. Why Some Parents Make Choices
Child-rearing is one of the biggest challenges that many adults
face. A parent has to make many sacrifices and invest much into a
child’s well-being. A new baby requires many years of dedication by
its parents to foster the child’s life, protect her from life’s difficulties,
30
and provide her every advantage that the parents can afford. Some
parents attempt to achieve these goals by taking certain steps before
the baby is even born—at conception or even earlier. While it is still
impossible to select which of our inheritable traits children should

24

Id. at 74.
Id.
26
See infra Part V. For statistics on how many parents choose to abort when they
discover that their fetus may be disabled, see infra note 34.
27
HARRIS, supra note 17, at 75.
28
See id.
29
Id. (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 267 (1977)) (alteration in original).
30
Jeffrey R. Botkin, Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of Medicine:
Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 265, 265 (2003).
25

STEIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/24/2010 5:55 PM

COMMENT

1123
31

have, thanks to advances in prenatal screening and genetic testing,
parents can still choose to accept a fetus that has already been con32
ceived, abort it, or choose not to conceive at all.
Reproductive genetic testing leads some prospective parents to
33
decide to prevent either a pregnancy or a birth. In some circumstances, this decision may be based upon a parent’s desire to avoid
34
having children who suffer from a genetic disease or condition. Advances in medical science have even expanded prenatal testing to
late-onset disorders, such as breast cancer, and to characteristics like
35
homosexuality.
Since the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to
36
have an abortion in Roe v. Wade, the concept of “every-child-a37
wanted child” has altered societal views and has “elevated the rejec38
tion of imperfect children [via abortions] to an enlightened choice.”
Society has started to view with disdain those parents who, armed with
information that the child will likely be disabled, still choose to have

31

McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 201 (“Amniocentesis, ultrasonography, and
chronic villus sampling (CVS) [make] it possible to look into the womb to check on
a fetus’s condition.”).
32
Botkin, supra note 30, at 265.
33
LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 300 (2d ed. 2006).
34
Id. As many as eighty or ninety percent of women choose to have an abortion
after finding out that they are pregnant with a child who has Down’s syndrome,
which, like other genetic diseases, is tested by amniocentesis. Christine Rosen, Taste:
A Life Worth Living, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at W11; see also George Neumayr, The
New Eugenics, AM. SPECTATOR, July 13, 2005, at 1, available at http://spectator.org/
archives/2005/07/13/the-new-eugenics; Philip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization
Laws, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
204, 213 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000) (“[W]idespread use
of prenatal screening coupled with selective abortion is causing a significant decline
in the number of children born with Down syndrome.”). “Amniocentesis” is a type
of prenatal screening whereby the amniotic fluid is withdrawn from the amniotic sac
and analyzed. ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 59. A high percentage of fetuses that have
tested positive for cystic fibrosis are also being aborted. Neumayr, supra, at 1.
35
Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 967, 970 (1996). Other detectable genetic disorders in addition to Down’s syndrome include Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, pseudohypertrophic muscular dystrophy, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, and sickle cell anemia. The Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal Genetic Testing, 3
ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 633, 635 (1994), available at http://archfami.ama-assn.org/cgi/
reprint/3/7/633.pdf.
36
410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973).
37
George Neumayr, The Perfect Child, AM. SPECTATOR, May 5, 2005, at 1, available
at http://spectator.org/archives/2005/05/05/the-perfect-child.
38
Id.
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39

that child. Some doctors may choose to encourage prenatal genetic
screening so that parents have sufficient information to engage in
“responsible parenthood,” which arguably includes a parent’s respon40
sibility to not knowingly transmit defects to offspring.
Margery
Shaw, a geneticist and attorney, goes further—she argues that to
knowingly transmit genetic defects to one’s child would be akin to
41
child abuse. “[C]hoice and prevention [have, evidently, begun to]
produce a culture that equates disability with irresponsible parenting
42
decisions.”
The result is peer pressure on parents to abort a child whom
43
they have reason to believe may be disabled. Today, parents who
could have prevented the birth of a disabled child either by not conceiving or by aborting are asked to justify their actions—why have a
44
disabled child when the opportunity not to exists? Prenatal screening and the option to abort a fetus upon learning of its defects
(coupled with social pressures to have healthy children and possible
pressures from the doctor to have an abortion to avoid future liabili45
ty) lead parents who would not have otherwise aborted a fetus to
choose that route.
In the future, parents opting not to birth a disabled child will
likely increase. Modern biotechnology will enlarge the array of genetic testing that can be performed on a person before conception
and during pregnancy to determine the likelihood of having a disabled child. Additionally, more people will choose to prevent the

39

Neumayr, supra note 34, at 2.
Paul Ramsey, Screening: An Ethicist’s View, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS:
GENETIC COUNSELING AND THE USE OF GENETIC KNOWLEDGE 147, 150 (Bruce Hilton et
al. eds., 1973).
41
Botkin, supra note 30, at 272.
42
Rosen, supra note 34.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
The recognition of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits “will place increased
pressure upon physicians to take the ‘safe’ course by recommending abortion” to
avoid future liability. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1985). The
Azzolino court indicated that this pressure is best illustrated by this story:
A clinical instructor asks his students to advise an expectant mother on
the fate of a fetus whose father has chronic syphilis. Early siblings were
born with a collection of defects such as deafness, blindness, and retardation. The usual response of the students is: “Abort!” The teacher
then calmly replies: “Congratulations, you have just aborted Beethoven.”
Id. (citation omitted).
40
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birth of a disabled child if given the opportunity, in large part due to
pure ability to make such choices and because of the social pressures
and financial costs of rearing a disabled child.
Although many parents can cope with the birth of a disabled
child, the fact is the path is a difficult one and is sufficiently demand46
ing that many people may choose to avoid this kind of challenge.
Some parents can love and support a disabled child without a nega47
tive impact on their marriage or family. There are others, however,
who cannot. Time, energy, and sacrifices are needed to successfully
48
cope with a child’s disability. In addition, financial resources are
49
required to deal with the expenses of raising a child with a disability.
Therefore, parents might choose not to have a genetically impaired
child to avoid the prohibitive financial costs incurred in raising a
50
child with a severe genetic disease. Ultimately, “economic and social
pressures may create situations where reproductive decision making
51
is constrained as if the situation were legislated.” A lack of economic security, insurance, or social support could determine whether
parents will choose to prevent the birth of children at risk for a genet52
ic disorder. The financial concerns, however, could be allayed by
proper health care coverage.
C. An Insufficient Health Care System
The financial burden on parents to care for disabled children is
53
no small consideration. First, many health insurers refuse to cover

46

Botkin, supra note 30, at 290.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Cf. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 637 (“[L]ack
of social and economic support for the disabled might dissuade parents who would
otherwise bear and raise an affected child from choosing to reproduce.”); see also infra Part II.C.
51
McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 202.
52
See id.
53
Paul T. Shattuck & Susan L. Parish, Financial Burden in Families of Children with
Special Health Care Needs: Variability Among States, 122 PEDIATRICS 13, 13–14 (2008),
available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/122/1/13 (“The costs of
caring for children with special health care needs (CSHCN) are high, relative to
those for typically developing children, because of elevated requirements for both
primary and specialty medical care, as well as therapeutic and supportive services
such as rehabilitation, environmental adaptations, assistive devices, personal assistance, and mental health, home health, and respite care. . . . [M]ean direct out-of47
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the costs of necessary treatments for certain disorders.
Certain
plans do not cover needed items, such as special formulas and foods,
55
neurodevelopmental assessments, and therapies for children. Many
managed-care plans have restrictions as to what professionals may be
consulted (only in-network professionals, for example) and whether
56
specialized services may be used. Sometimes, the in-network doctors
lack sufficient expertise to deal with the problems that some of these
57
children face. For complex disorders, children should be treated by
a team of doctors in several disciplines and various areas of exper58
tise. Yet getting such a team of doctors together often proves prohi59
bitive and beyond the boundaries of private insurance coverage.
Thus, the inadequacy of insurance coverage and insufficient access to
the most qualified doctors prevent many disabled children from re60
ceiving optimal care. Moreover, some children have neither any
health care coverage at all nor the means to pay for necessary treat61
ments.
Second, having “a child with a significant disability can have an
adverse effect on the parents in terms of heartache, worry, time, ef62
fort, and money.” Therefore, aside from the strain on their pockets
due to insufficient health care coverage of their disabled children,
parents may also have to contend with insufficient funding for psychological and support services for themselves and other family

pocket expenditures for families with CSHCN were more than twice the mean for
families with nondisabled children.” (footnotes omitted)).
54
See, e.g., AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, American Academy of Pediatrics,
Newborn Screening: A Blueprint for the Future: A Call for a National Agenda on State Newborn Screening Programs, 106 PEDIATRICS 389, 390 (2000), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/106/2/S1/389 (discussing treatment for phenylketonuria); AZ AUTISM INSURANCE, AUTISM SPEAKS: ARGUMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF PRIVATE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF AUTISM-RELATED SERVICES 4 (2007),
http://www.azautisminsurance.org/files/Arguments%20for%20private%20insuranc
e%20coverage%20-%20Autism%20Speaks.pdf (“Most insurance policies contain
specific exclusions for autism . . . , [thus] families must pay for costly treatments outof-pocket or forego them.”).
55
AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 422.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 422.
62
Botkin, supra note 30, at 290.
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members. Of course, the parents’ interest to be free from these adverse consequences diminishes as the severity of the child’s congenit64
al condition decreases.
In addition, despite the provisions in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, no significant health care coverage is
65
available for infants. Likewise, state mandates that require private
insurance benefit packages to include items such as formula or nutritional supplements to meet the needs of sick children do not apply to
66
self-funded employer-based benefit plans. This means that twentyfive to fifty percent of individuals covered under such plans will not
67
be protected by the state mandates regarding insurance benefits.
Furthermore, although federal law guarantees Medicaid coverage to
newborns for the first year of their lives, many states lack effective
68
measures for the implementation of these guarantees. In five states,
the insurance benefit packages under non-Medicaid State Children’s
Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP) exclude coverage for the costs
of hearing aids, some medical equipment and other devices, and
therapies for certain developmental conditions or chronic conditions
69
that are not expected to improve over time.
While the aforementioned limitations on health care coverage
pertain only to disabled infants and children and their parents, the
problems with health care coverage persist into the disabled child’s
adult life as well. For many disabled persons, in fact, the problem is
exacerbated when they become adults because they no longer qualify
70
for Medicaid, SCHIP, and other publicly funded programs.
At least one state, California, has recognized how the lack of financial means to care for a disabled person may persuade parents to
71
avoid the birth of a disabled child. In Turpin v. Sortini, the Supreme
72
Court of California discussed California’s wrongful life statute,
which permits a cause of action to be brought against physicians but

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 422.
Botkin, supra note 30, at 290.
AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 421.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 959 (Cal. 1982).
See id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 2007).
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73

not parents. The court indicated that that history “suggest[s] that
the purpose of the legislation was simply to eliminate any liability or
other similar economic pressure which might induce potential par74
ents to abort or decline to conceive a potentially defective child.”
Evidently, the concern that parents might be pressured into aborting
disabled children solely on the basis of financial considerations was so
compelling that the state was moved to take statutory action; California wanted to ensure that disabled children could never sue their
parents for giving birth to them notwithstanding the opportunity to
abort or avoid conception. But California, and all other jurisdictions,
should go even further to eliminate the economic pressures on “par75
ents to abort or decline to conceive a potentially defective child” by
enacting legislation that provides sufficient health care coverage to
children born with genetic defects.
D. Summary
Parents, armed with the right to procreative autonomy, are free
to choose whether to have a disabled child without interference from
the state. How that choice is made is based upon many factors, one
of which is exorbitant health care costs for the disabled individual.
With proper health care coverage, however, this critical factor could
be eliminated; some parents, comforted by the knowledge that their
wallets are adequately protected, may choose to proceed with a pregnancy despite the risks of having a disabled child.
III. LEGAL REDRESS WHEN PARENTS HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR
RIGHT TO CHOOSE: THE RISE OF WRONGFUL BIRTH AND
WRONGFUL LIFE TORTS
Usually, in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits, the negligence
of a prenatal-care physician has led to the birth of a disabled child—a
child that allegedly would not have been born at all if the doctor had
properly warned the parents of the risks. For example, an obstetrician might negligently fail to advise a thirty-eight-year-old woman in
the early stages of pregnancy of the increased risk of a woman that
age bearing a child with Down’s syndrome and fail to offer prenatal

73
74
75

See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 959.
Id.
Id.
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testing for this disease (a technique which has been available to
77
pregnant women for over two decades). In the event that the thirty78
eight-year-old woman gives birth to a child with Down’s syndrome,
her obstetrician may be liable to the mother and/or the child—
79
depending on the jurisdiction —for failing to warn of the increased
risk and discuss available prenatal screening.
A. The Claims Made in Each Cause of Action
While both wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action
arise out of the same set of facts, the claims are slightly different.
“Wrongful birth” is a cause of action whereby the parents of a disabled child sue their prenatal-care physician for precluding the parents from making an informed family-planning decision by not disclosing to them either (i) the risk of inheritability of the condition at
80
conception or (ii) whether the fetus, if already conceived, might be
disabled. For instance, if a doctor negligently interprets the results of
a prenatal screening, the parents can sue the doctor in a wrongful
81
birth action for not informing them that their fetus is disabled. The
wrongful birth action allows the parents to seek damages resulting
from having to raise a disabled child, which they would have aborted
82
but for the doctor’s negligence. Similarly, in a “wrongful life” suit,
the disabled child sues the negligent physician for damages he or she
83
has suffered from having been born. The child argues that but for

76

Cf. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808–09 (N.Y. 1978). In Becker, a thirtyseven-year-old pregnant mother was “never advised by [doctors] of the increased risk
of Down’s Syndrome in children born to women over 35 years of age. Nor [was she]
advised . . . of the availability of an amniocentesis test to determine whether the fetus
. . . would be born afflicted with Down’s Syndrome.” Id. (footnote omitted).
77
Botkin, supra note 30, at 266.
78
Cf. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 11 (Minn. 1986) (noting that at the time the mother became pregnant, she was thirty-four years old, and
she alleged that her treating physician did not offer her the option of testing for
Down’s syndrome despite the increased risk of a thirty-five-year-old woman bearing a
Down’s syndrome child).
79
See infra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
80
ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 58.
81
Id.
82
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 2.
83
Id. Maine characterizes the injury in wrongful life suits as “not life itself but
rather having to live with a disease or defect.” Anastosopoulos v. Perakis, No. CV-91313, 1995 Me. Super. LEXIS 504, at *17 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 1995).
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the physician’s negligence, he or she would never have been born
84
and forced to live a life of pain and suffering.
Furthermore, it is prudent to note the distinction between the
injuries that are claimed in wrongful birth and wrongful life actions
versus other prenatal tort actions. In wrongful birth and wrongful
life suits, the doctor’s negligence led to the birth of a disabled child—
a child that allegedly would not have been born at all if the doctor
had properly warned the parents. This is quite distinguishable from
the prenatal-injury tort where the doctor’s negligence causes the fetus to suffer some harm in utero—but for the doctor’s negligence, the
85
child would have been born “with a sound mind and body.” The
claimed loss in the wrongful birth tort is lost opportunity—the parents’ opportunity to make an informed decision and their opportuni86
ty to choose to not have a particular child. Courts that have recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth focus on this lost
opportunity: “As the wrongful birth decisions recognize, when a doctor or other medical care provider negligently fails to diagnose an
[sic] hereditary problem, parents are deprived of the opportunity to
make an informed and meaningful decision whether to conceive and
87
bear a handicapped child.” It is also possible that the birth of an
unwanted disabled child, who generally requires a greater parental
investment of time, effort, and money than a healthy child, may impinge on parents’ opportunity to have other children in the future—
88
this is further lost opportunity.
84

Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 494 (Wash. 1983).
Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960). In prenatal-injury tort actions, physicians have been held liable for disabilities caused by their negligence
connected with the birth itself. Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 674–75 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1999). The wrongful birth tort, however, often involves a negligent failure
during the early stages of pregnancy to inform parents of the risks of certain birth
defects. Id. at 675.
86
Prenatal-injury tort actions, unlike wrongful birth actions, do not involve “the
intermediate step of parental action.” Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 675. The allegation that
the negligence of the physician robbed the parents of their opportunity to terminate
the pregnancy is not present in prenatal-injury tort actions as it is in wrongful birth.
Id. Parents in wrongful birth cases have this right to an abortion “but argue that the
physician’s negligence deprived them of . . . [their] right under controlling federal
precedent to terminate a pregnancy.” Id. at 676.
87
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982); see also, e.g., Berman v. Allan,
404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979).
88
“Parental Investment (P.I.) is defined as any investment by the parent in [a
child] that increases [that child]’s chance of surviving . . . at the cost of the parent’s
ability to invest in other [children].” RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 124 (30th
anniversary ed. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ny particular adult
85
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B. The Extent to Which Each Cause of Action Has Been Recognized
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits have not been given the
same breadth of legal recognition, nor have they been received
equally by courts and legislatures in the United States. Of the jurisdictions in the United States that have considered the issue, a majori89
ty has recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth. Of those
states that recognize the wrongful birth tort, most do not allow recov90
91
ery for emotional distress, but some do. Several states, however,
have declined to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth by
court decisions: Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, and North
92
Carolina. In addition, some state legislatures have enacted statutes
individual has, in her whole lifetime, a certain total quantity of P.I. [parental investment] available to invest in children . . . . This represents the sum of all the food she
can gather or manufacture in a lifetime of work, all the risks she is prepared to take,
and all the energy and effort that she is able to put into the welfare of children.” Id.
For further discussion on parental investment, see id. at 124–39.
89
See Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1031 (Ala. 1993); Lininger v. Eisenbaum,
764 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Colo. 1988); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 886 (D.C.
App. 1987); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. App. 1981), overruled by
Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992) (refusing to apply impact doctrine in
wrongful birth claims but still recognizing wrongful birth claims); Blake v. Cruz, 698
P.2d 315, 319 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 706
(Ill. 1987); Arche v. United States, 798 P.2d 477, 481 (Kan. 1990); Pitre v. Opelousas
Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1162 (La. 1988); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 348
(N.H. 1986); Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assocs., 844 N.E.2d
1160, 1168 (Ohio 2006); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1981); Schloss v.
Miriam Hosp., C.A. No. 98-2076, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 116, at *8 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Jan. 11, 1999); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488
(Wash. 1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St.
Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975); see also Becker v. Schwartz, 386
N.E.2d 807, 811, 813 (N.Y. 1978). In Becker, the court characterized the cause of action for “wrongful birth” as one whereby an “illegitimate, but otherwise healthy child,
seeks recovery in his or her own behalf for the injury suffered as a consequence of his
or her birth into this world as a stigmatized child,” which seems to bea mischaracterization of the tort. Id. The court, however, concluded that the parents had a valid
cause of action in negligence or medical malpractice for pecuniary loss, or special
damages, “which the parents have borne, and . . . must continue to bear, for the care
and treatment of their infants,” which by any other name is infact the wrongful birth
tort. Id.
90
Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993).
91
See, e.g., id. at 1030; Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 320 (Idaho 1984); Naccash v.
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483,
494 (Wash. 1983).
92
See Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 212 (Ga. 1999); Grubbs v. Barbourville
Family Health Ctr., P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Ky. 2003); Taylor v. Kurapati, 600
N.W.2d 670, 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Mo.
1988); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985). Missouri also
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93

barring actions for wrongful birth. Over twenty states have declined
94
to recognize claims for wrongful life either by the states’ courts or
95
legislatures. The only states in the United States that recognize a
wrongful life cause of action are California, Maine, New Jersey, and
96
Washington. New Jersey decided to recognize a wrongful life cause
enacted legislation barring the causes of action for wrongful birth and wrongful life.
See infra notes 94 and 96. In Wilson, however, the state judicially declined to recognize these causes of action. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 746.
93
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-12-1-1 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. and 2009 Special Sess.);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2971(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 2 of 2010
Legis. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 145.424(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 188.130 (West, Westlaw through 95th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (LEXIS through 2009 Legis. Sess.); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8305(a) (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (Westlaw through 2009 Legis. of
84th Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-109 (LEXIS through 2009 1st Special Sess.).
94
See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Walker ex rel. Pizano
v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1210
(Colo. 1988); Garrison ex rel. Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 293–94
(Del. 1990); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423–24 (Fla. 1992); Spires v. Kim, 416
S.E.2d 780, 781–82 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512
N.E.2d 691, 702 (Ill. 1987); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406, 410 (Ill. 1986);
Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ind. 1991); Bruggeman v.
Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (Kan. 1986); Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr.,
P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682, 689–90 (Ky. 2003); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So. 2d
1019, 1024–25 (La. Ct. App. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 530 So. 2d 1151, 1163
(La. 1988) (affirming the court of appeal’s judgment that sustained the rejection of
the wrongful life claim and overruled the rejection of the wrongful birth claim); Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1123 (Md. 2002); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8,
12–13 (Mass. 1990); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347–48 (Nev. 1995); Smith
ex rel. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353–55 (N.H. 1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 386
N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985);
Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1165 (Ohio 2000); Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., C.A.
No. 98-2076, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 116, at *16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1999); Willis
v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 71 (S.C. 2004); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924–25 (Tex.
1984); Glascock v. Laserna, 30 Va. Cir. 366, 369 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993); Barnes v. Head,
30 Va. Cir. 218, 221–22 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881
(W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1975);
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 290 (Wyo. 1982).
95
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. and 2009 Special Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2971(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 2
of 2010 Legis. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg.
Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West, Westlaw through 95th Gen. Assembly, 1st
Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (LEXIS through 2009 Legis. Sess.); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (Westlaw
through 2009 Legis. of 84th Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-109 (LEXIS through
2009 1st Special Sess.).
96
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess
of 124th Legis.); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 478
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of action so that the disabled child could recover the extra expenses
directly related to the child’s disability and avoid an injustice by reason of the parents’ wrongful birth claim having been barred by the
97
statute of limitations. The recovery in all four of the states that recognize the tort for wrongful life, however, is limited to only special
98
damages (extra medical expenses related to the care of the child).
Countries other than the United States have also recognized wrong99
ful life claims.
Most courts that have refused to recognize a cause of action for
wrongful life have declined to do so for reasons other than eugenic
100
implications.
For instance, courts have declined to recognize
A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984), remanded to 502 A.2d 94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985), rev’d on
other grounds, 543 A.2d 985, 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (dismissing only
plaintiff’s count of legal malpractice against certain defendants); Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
97
Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762.
98
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3); Turpin, 643 P.2d at 966; Procanik, 478
A.2d at 762; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495.
99
Although South Africa and most jurisdictions in the world have declined to
recognize a cause of action for wrongful life, Israel and Holland have recognized this
cause of action. Stewart & Another v Botha & Another 2008 (6) SA 310 (SCA) at 316, ¶
13 (S. Afr.); see also CA 512/81 Zeitsov v. Katz [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 85; Leids Universitair Medisch Centrum/Kelly Molenaar, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 18 maart 2005, RvdW 2005, 42 (Neth.). France’s
highest appeals court had held that handicapped children can receive compensation
if their mothers had not been given the opportunity to choose to have an abortion.
Rod Dreher, French Abort Law Does Nazis Proud, N.Y. POST, July 15, 2001, at 022.
French courts, however, only recognized this cause of action from 1996 to 2001, because the political pressure resulted in an act being passed on March 4, 2002, prohibiting such claims. Stewart, (6) SA at 316, ¶ 13.
100
Another concern, though one that is beyond the scope of this Comment,
which has been raised in support of the argument against recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life is that recognizing this cause of action may be a half-step to
permitting a child to sue his or her parent(s) for choosing to conceive despite the
known risks involved or opting not to terminate a pregnancy despite the positive test
results. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980) (“If a case arose where, despite due care by the medical profession in transmitting the necessary warnings, parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a
pregnancy, with full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant would be born . . . we
see no sound public policy which should protect those parents from being answerable for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought upon their
offspring.”). In an Illinois case, however, where the state attorney sued a woman for
deciding not to have a Cesarean section for religious reasons, the “court held that a
woman has no duty to guarantee the physical and mental health of her child.” Andrews, supra note 35, at 998 (citing In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994)). A woman should be able to refuse to undergo an abortion or choose to
have a child despite high risks of conceiving a child with a genetic disease and raise a
child who may be disabled or sick without a concern that her child will turn around
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wrongful life claims because “the theory [that the child should not
have been born at all] amounts to a repudiation of the value of hu101
man life.” Courts have focused on the preciousness of life and have
had little discussion (if any) of the negative eugenic implications in
102
recognizing this cause of action.

and sue her for having been born. It would be “inconceivable” that a woman who
chooses not to avail herself of her right to terminate a pregnancy would be deemed
to be making an unlawful choice. Stewart, (6) SA at 316, ¶ 19. Presumably, if the law
recognizes a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy as a fundamental one based on
issues of privacy and autonomy, then these same reasons should substantiate her
right not to terminate a pregnancy. See id.
In further response to this concern—of disabled children suing their parents for
choosing to continue with the pregnancy despite their knowledge of the disability—
state legislatures can enact provisions to curtail this type of liability. For instance, the
California legislature enacted a provision indicating that “[n]o cause of action arises
against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been
conceived, or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive.”
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 2007). The purpose of enacting this statute was to eliminate the fear of liability or any other economic pressure that may induce parents to
abort or to not conceive a potentially disabled child. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954,
959 (Cal. 1982).
101
Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho 1984); see also Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d
63, 69 (S.C. 2004).
102
See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547–48 (Ala. 1978) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because it is impossible to calculate damages
and because there is no legal right not to be born); Willis, 607 S.E.2d at 69–70 (indicating that courts have rejected the wrongful life claim because no legally cognizable
injury results and for lack of proximate causation). Some courts have questioned the
rationale used by other courts in rejecting a cause of action for wrongful life. For
example, the Supreme Court of California indicated that it would be “hard to see
how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering child would ‘disavow’ the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is not entitled to the full
measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to all members of society.” Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961–62. The California court, however, entered dangerous
waters when it indicated that there could be cases where the disability of the child is
so severe that there could be “societal consensus” that never having been born at all
is preferable to life. Id. at 962–63.
[Where] the plaintiff’s only affliction is deafness, it seems quite unlikely that a jury would ever conclude that life with such a condition is
worse than not being born at all. Other wrongful life cases, however,
have involved children with much more serious, debilitating and painful conditions, and the academic literature refers to still other, extremely severe hereditary diseases. Considering the short life span of
many of these children and their frequently very limited ability to
perceive or enjoy the benefits of life, we cannot assert with confidence
that in every situation there would be a societal consensus that life is
preferable to never having been born at all.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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C. Summary
When parents are deprived of their opportunity to choose
whether to conceive or proceed with a pregnancy of a disabled fetus
(because of the negligent conduct of a prenatal-care physician),
many states permit the parents to sue the negligent physician for the
extraordinary costs they will incur in connection with the rearing of a
disabled child and sometimes permit the parents to recover for the
emotional distress they endure as a proximate result of the birth of
this unwanted disabled child. Very few states allow the child to sue,
and those that do only allow recovery for the extra costs the child will
incur associated with the disability. A remarkable minority of jurisdictions that have considered either the wrongful birth or wrongful
life suit (or both) discussed eugenics despite the eugenic implications
103
in the recognition of these suits.
IV. EUGENICS: A HISTORY
The question of whether eugenics is a thing of the past or is still
a part of our culture today depends on how we understand the term
104
“eugenics.” Generally speaking, eugenics “is the ‘science of the im105
provement of the human race by better breeding.’”
The notion
“that the human race can be gradually improved and social ills simul106
taneously eliminated through a program of selective procreation,”
is a eugenic premise. In 1883, Francis Galton, a British naturalist and
Charles Darwin’s cousin, coined the term “eugenics” from the Greek
term eugenes, which means “‘good in stock, hereditarily endowed with
107
noble qualities.’”
He suggested that we improve the human race
more “‘quickly and kindly’” than what nature could do by evolution
108
“‘blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly.’” Eugenics promotes the reproduction of the fit over the unfit and seeks to prevent the birth of the un-

103

For a discussion of the jurisdictions that did touch on eugenics, see infra notes
166–68 and accompanying text.
104
McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 201.
105
RUTH CLIFFORD ENGS, THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, at xiii
(2005).
106
Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
107
See ENGS, supra note 105, at xiii; see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 199;
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 3.
108
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 3.
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109

fit.
Positive eugenics is the concept of encouraging those persons
110
with more desirable inheritable characteristics to reproduce, whereas negative eugenics relates to the means by which those persons
with less desirable traits (e.g., criminals, mentally and physically dis111
abled persons, etc.) are discouraged from reproducing.
Often the term “eugenics” conjures memories of Hitler’s regime
and the Nazis’ mass murder of certain designated undesirables, in112
cluding the disabled.
Few may remember the history of this practice in the United States or know that this country may have inspired
113
the Nazis’ own eugenic practices. In the first half of the twentieth
century, some societies moved to reduce unwanted populations from
the general population by sterilization, infanticide, euthanasia, and
114
other solutions.
In the United States, for example, eugenics dates as far back as
115
1897. At the beginning of the twentieth century, eugenics took the
116
form of sterilizing the enfeebled. In most states had laws that permitted the involuntary sterilization of people deemed less fit, which
117
The
resulted in the forced sterilization of at least 60,000 people.
eugenic sterilization programs of the early-twentieth century came
with public displays at state fairs featuring promotional slogans, such
as, “Some people are born to be a burden on the rest,” and “Every 15
seconds $100 of your money goes for the care of persons with bad heredity such as the insane feeble-minded, criminals [and] other defec-

109

James E. Bowman, Genetics and the Law: The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications
of Genetic Technology and Biomedical Ethics: The Road to Eugenics, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 491, 492 (1996).
110
See ENGS, supra note 105, at xiii; see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 202
(defining positive eugenics as the promotion of “increased production of ‘geniuses’
and people of great talent, through encouraging more scientific selection of mates,
and more breeding by the chosen few”).
111
See ENGS, supra note 105, at xiii; see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 202
(“‘[N]egative eugenics’ was concerned with eliminating the least fit individuals
through reducing or eliminating their reproduction.”).
112
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 1.
113
See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
114
Bowman, supra note 109, at 492.
115
Reilly, supra note 34, at 206 (“The nation’s first sterilization bill was introduced
in the Michigan legislature in 1897.”).
116
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 3.
117
McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 200.
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119

tives.” In 1927, in Buck v. Bell, the U.S. Supreme Court approved
120
the states’ right to sterilize people with intellectual disabilities.
In
Buck, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “[t]hree generations
121
of imbeciles are enough.”
In 1933 Nazi Germany enacted its own law (modeled after California’s sterilization program) that led to the involuntary sterilization
of more than 300,000 people, a majority of whom were feeble122
minded. In addition, between 1939 and 1945, Germany euthanized
123
more than 200,000 mentally and physically disabled people.
During the first half of the twentieth century, the United States and Germany were not alone in implementing sterilization programs for
people with disabilities; Denmark sterilized more than 8000 people
between 1930 and 1954, and Sweden sterilized more than 2000
124
people in 1948 alone.
With Nazi Germany having taken the science of eugenics to an
unprecedented level, eugenics seems to have fallen to the wayside as
a taboo subject. Perhaps the fight against the Nazis in World War II
and thwarting their attempt to create a master race made sterilization
125
laws no longer palatable.
The waning of the eugenics movement
126
was reflected in Skinner v. Oklahoma, which although not expressly
overruling Buck v. Bell, declared unconstitutional a law that would
118

Christina Cogdell, Smooth Flow: Biological Efficiency and Streamline Design, in
POPULAR EUGENICS: NATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND AMERICAN MASS CULTURE IN THE 1930S
217, 221 (Susan Currell & Christina Cogdell eds., 2006).
119
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
120
David Braddock & Susan Parish, An Institutional History of Disability, in
DISABILITY AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE STATE OF THE STATES 1, 29 (David Braddock ed. 2002).
121
Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. Justice Holmes’s preface to this infamous line is,
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser
sacrifices [sterilization], often not felt to be such by those concerned,
in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
Id.
122
Braddock & Parish, supra note 120, at 30; see also McGee & Magnus, supra note
8, at 201.
123
Braddock & Parish, supra note 120, at 30.
124
Id.
125
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 815.
126
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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deprive certain individuals of a basic liberty—the right to procreate.
The Court acknowledged that “[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised,
may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the domi128
nant group to wither and disappear.” New developments in reproductive technology and the law, however, have reopened the door to
eugenics in the United States.
V. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EUGENICS THROUGH DAMAGES AWARDS
The courts’ and legislatures’ recognition of the torts of wrongful
birth and wrongful life place an impetus behind a new eugenic
movement. As a consequence of holding physicians liable for the
birth of a disabled child who could never have been born a healthy
child, physicians will choose to err on the side of recommending
129
abortions or abstention from conception to avoid potential liability.
This conduct will have the cumulative effect of eliminating the genetically impaired. This effect becomes inevitable as prenatal screening
becomes more advanced and more parents take actions to ensure the
birth of a normal and healthy child. The government participates in
this new eugenic movement in two ways. First, the state engages in
eugenics when its judiciary or legislature imposes this type of liability
on physicians. Second, a state engages in eugenics when it judicially
or legislatively recognizes (i) that a child has been injured by its own
birth to a life with a disability (but not injured if born without a disability) and (ii) that parents have been damaged by the birth of their
unwanted disabled child (but not by the birth of an unwanted
healthy child).
Harriet McBryde Johnson, a disability-rights activist who died in
130
2008 at fifty years of age from a congenital neuromuscular disease,
was aware of eugenic thinking vis-à-vis the disabled. She wrote that
“‘[t]he peculiar drama of [her] life ha[d] placed [her] in a world
that by and large thinks it would be better if people like [her] did not
131
exist.’”

127
128
129
130
131

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 814–15.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
See supra note 45.
Rosen, supra note 34.
Id.
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The efforts of activists like Harriet Johnson have prevented our
132
society from neglecting persons with disabilities.
While her fight
was one for accommodation for disabled persons, society seems to
now be “in a disturbing situation: As our scientific powers to elimi133
nate disability grow, our acceptance of disability wanes.” There is a
societal move to prevent the births of disabled children through the
tools of prenatal screening and genetic testing and the exercise of
one’s right to reproductive choice. In 2005 the head of the American
Association of People with Disabilities indicated that the use of prenatal screening to prevent the birth of disabled persons has placed
society on a slippery slope toward “‘a new eugenics, and [he does
134
not] know where it is going to end.’”
More subtle hints of contemporary, positive eugenic practices
include prenatal-care programs that encourage pregnant women to
eat well and abstain from alcohol consumption and tobacco usage to
135
increase the likelihood of having a healthy child.
The cumulative
effect of the availability and use of reproductive genetic testing, however, together with awards of damages in wrongful birth and wrongful
life suits, is a less subtle form of eugenics.
From exercising choice and acting discriminatorily as a prospective parent to attaching a stigma and involving the state in that individual choice, a backdoor eugenics movement has sprung. Eugenics
starts with control and choices—the control of factors that influence
reproduction with the view to improving the species and choosing
which traits should be inherited and which ones should be eliminated. Discrimination is a natural byproduct of choice. Some types of
discrimination, however, are invidious because they involve prejudice
136
and/or stereotyping.
The discrimination involved in parents’
choosing which genetic traits they want their children to inherit is a
natural and, currently, legal consequence of a parent’s right to pro137
creative autonomy.
When the state, however, involves itself in the
decision-making process—to a point where it legitimizes the disability
hierarchy that society and parents have created and incentivizes physicians to recommend abortions or abstentions from conception
132

See id.
Id.
134
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 1.
135
ENGS, supra note 105, at xvi.
136
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “invidious discrimination”).
137
See supra Part II.A.
133
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when risks of birthing disabled children exist—then the state is engaging in eugenics, and this is wrong.
The law accelerated a new eugenic movement by awarding damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits. For example, damages
awards to disabled children and to parents of disabled children in
wrongful life and wrongful birth suits, respectively, legitimize the
claims that a person is harmed by being born disabled or by having a
disabled child. This legitimization is furthered in wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy cases when a state refuses to award the
same types of damages to parents who had unwanted healthy children.
Maine, for instance, has enacted legislation that prohibits damages awards “for the birth or rearing of a healthy child” because the
legislature felt “that the birth of a normal, healthy child does not
138
constitute a legally recognizable injury.”
The statute provides that
no person may “receive an award for damages based on the claim that
the birth and rearing of a healthy child resulted in damages to
139
him.” The same statute, however, permits awards of special damages “for the birth of an unhealthy child” resulting from a physician’s
140
negligence. Most courts in the United States have similarly refused
to award the costs of rearing a normal, healthy child in wrongful con141
ception and wrongful pregnancy cases, but will award certain costs
142
in the rearing of unhealthy children in wrongful birth cases.
The state should not engage in this kind of discriminatory
treatment. The disparate treatment of disabled children and healthy
children in similar negligence cases implies that disabled children (1)
are to be less cherished than healthy children, (2) are harmful to
parents, and (3) cause a legally cognizable injury to their parents.
These negative implications are discriminatory, stigmatize the disabled community, and breathe new life into a eugenic movement.
Moreover, eugenics is unconstitutional. “[N]owhere in Articles
V and XIV of the U.S. Constitution, [nor] the Declaration of Independence . . . is there any indication that ‘the lives of persons suffering from physical handicaps are to be less cherished than those of

138
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(1) (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. of
124th Legis.).
139
Id. § 2931(2).
140
Id. § 2931(3).
141
See infra note 227.
142
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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143

non-handicapped human beings.’” No one is perfect. “‘Each of us
suffers from some ailments and impairments, whether major or minor, which make impossible participation in all the activities the
world has to offer. But our lives are not thereby rendered less precious than those of others whose impairments are less pervasive or
144
less severe.’”
Because no one can claim perfection, no one can
claim that his life is more worthy than another’s.
Furthermore, disabled persons have lives of value. While Harriet
145
Johnson suffered from muscular dystrophy, she did not let her
condition become an insurmountable obstacle to living life to its ful146
She fought
lest as a lawyer and an activist for disability rights.
147
against the stereotype that disabled people live lives of suffering. As
one commentator noted, what really oppresses disabled persons is
not their own disability but the discrimination, stereotyping, and lack
of accommodation that makes life as a disabled person much more
148
difficult. And Johnson recognized that while “many things may be
entirely foreclosed or more trouble than they’re worth, the possibilities that remain are so numerous, so varied, so far beyond the capacity of one person to experience, so marvelous—that they might just as
149
well be infinite.”
To have a preference for nondisabled children over disabled
children deprives the latter of the same respect and protection that is
150
accorded the former.
Such a preference implies that disabled
children are not equal to nondisabled children because they are va151
lued less. Many people hope that when they have a child, the child
will not be disabled. Whether this hope means that parents are devaluing and discriminating against children with disabilities, however, is
not the issue. The issue is the courts’ and state legislatures’ intention143
Allan H. Macurdy, Commentary, Disability Ideology and the Law School Curriculum, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 443, 453 (1995).
144
Id. at 454.
145
HARRIET MCBRYDE JOHNSON, TOO LATE TO DIE YOUNG: NEARLY TRUE TALES FROM
A LIFE 7 (2005).
146
See generally id.
147
See id. at 253.
148
Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950–2000, at 374 (Solinger ed., 1998), reprinted in THE
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MOTHERHOOD 231, 233 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008).
149
JOHNSON, supra note 145, at 257–58.
150
See HARRIS, supra note 17, at 88.
151
See id.

STEIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

1142

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/24/2010 5:55 PM

[Vol. 40:1117

al or inadvertent condonation and encouragement of these parental
preferences. It well may be that when parents act on the hope that
their children will not be disabled, it is a form of possibly invidious
discrimination against the disabled community. On the other hand,
who can say it is wrong for deaf parents to want to have a similarly
152
disabled child?
Nevertheless, it is when government becomes involved in these parental choices that there is cause for concern.
While parents may legally discriminate in their exercise of the
153
right to choose, when a state chooses to discriminate against the
154
disabled, it must have a rational basis for such discrimination. Bias
155
is not a permissible basis for discrimination by the state.
Consequently, the state may not treat disabled children differently from
nondisabled children solely to “defer[] to the wishes or objections of
156
some fraction of the body politic.” Private biases are outside the jurisdiction of the law, and so are parents’ procreative choices. Indeed,
157
“‘the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give [these biases] effect.’”
Thus, states’ awards of damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions are a rubberstamp of, and an impetus behind, society’s move
toward a new eugenics.
Although women in the United States are neither prohibited by
law from conceiving when a risk of conceiving a genetically impaired
158
child exists nor compelled to abort genetically impaired fetuses,
tomorrow’s eugenic, discriminatory, and stigmatic effects of today’s
damages awards are a very real threat. Physicians, fearful of incurring
liability in wrongful birth or wrongful life suits, will likely be more
159
proactive in prenatal screening and recommending abortions.
Compulsory prenatal screening (or abortions), therefore, could
“equally occur in the absence of [state] compulsion, if widespread
genetic screening becomes accepted . . . as part of routine medical

152

See id. at 89 (“[Some] deaf people do in fact wish their children to be deaf like
them . . . [because] there is a distinctive deaf culture which is in some senses better
than that available to those with hearing.”).
153
See supra Part II.A.
154
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(“[L]egislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”).
155
See id. at 448.
156
Id.
157
Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
158
Cf. infra note 226 and accompanying text.
159
See supra note 45.
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160

practice.” The cumulative effect of this practice will have the same
eugenic effect as if the law had directly compelled the abortions of
genetically disabled fetuses in utero.
The state may have a legitimate interest in ensuring that parents
and disabled children recover the extraordinary costs of raising a
child with a disability and living with that disability through adulthood, respectively. The state, however, would rather these costs fall
on doctors and their insurance providers, if not the families of dis161
abled children, as opposed to the state itself.
The state does not
162
want to support its disabled community. Thus, instead of enacting
proper health care legislation to remedy the insufficiency of health
care coverage for disabled children, the judiciary and the legislature
seek to award damages against negligent doctors in wrongful birth
and wrongful life cases to reduce the financial burden on parents and
their children.
The state’s inaction in redressing the inadequacies of the health
care system has a domino effect. The lack of coverage compels parents to sue for costs to ease their burdens. The lack of coverage then
motivates the courts and state legislatures to ease the strain on the
parents through awards of special damages. This potential for liability then incentivizes doctors to be proactive in preventing the births of
disabled children. The end result is the deliberate manipulation of
reproduction by eliminating the births of genetically disabled child163
ren. And this becomes backdoor eugenics. Thus, states should expand health care coverage for genetically disabled children so that
the path to eugenics is effectively blocked.
A. Damages in Wrongful Birth
American jurisprudence vis-à-vis wrongful birth actions directs
the value choices of parents by granting damages awards to a parent
for the harm of having an unwanted disabled child. Here, states are
influencing, or implicitly dictating, a particular choice or result
through their judiciary or legislative branches. This jurisprudence
160

Ramsey, supra note 40, at 163.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)–(8) (2000). In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress sought to assure the economic self-sufficiency for disabled individuals and expressed its displeasure in having to spend “billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity” of disabled
persons. Id.
162
See supra note 161.
163
See supra note 1.
161
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travels the same path that American courts paved in the early twentieth century when they recognized and condoned sterilization laws
164
targeting the enfeebled.
In 1967, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey first broached
the issue of whether it would recognize a cause of action for either
wrongful birth or wrongful life, the court, in refusing to recognize either tort, nonetheless gave short shrift to any possible eugenic implications of allowing such claims: “Eugenic considerations are not controlling. We are not talking here about the breeding of prize
165
cattle.”
The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, refused to recognize a
cause of action for wrongful birth because it resounded in eugenics:
The very phrase “wrongful birth” suggests that the birth of the
disabled child was wrong and should have been prevented. If one
accepts the premise that the birth of one “defective” child should
have been prevented, then it is but a short step to accepting the
premise that the births of classes of “defective” children should be
similarly prevented, not just for the benefit of the parents but also
for the benefit of society as a whole through the protection of the
166
“public welfare.” This is the operating principle of eugenics.

The Michigan Court of Appeals further expressed concern about following the pattern of the early twentieth century, when courts (and
jurists as respected as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes) did not have a
167
problem authorizing forced sterilization. In reaching its decision to
168
uphold the sterilization laws in 1927, in Buck v. Bell, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Joseph DeJar169
nette. Referring to the nefarious experiments of the Third Reich,
Dr. DeJarnette said, “‘No person unable to support himself on ac170
count of his inherited mental condition has a right to be born.’”
That jurisprudential history implies that the judicial system is susceptible to the views and biases of society. The law, therefore, should take
care to ensure that it does not affirm parents’ efforts, and possibly
physicians’ efforts as well, to achieve the “betterment” of mankind at
the expense of a minority group through wrongful discrimination.
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

See supra notes 113–121 and accompanying text.
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967).
Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
See id. at 689.
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
See Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 690.
Id. at 689.

STEIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/24/2010 5:55 PM

COMMENT

1145

“The goal of reducing the incidence of genetic conditions is not acceptable, since this aim is explicitly eugenic; [medical] professionals
should not present any reproductive decisions as ‘correct’ or advan171
tageous for a person or society.” Similarly, the legal system should
not award damages to parents in a wrongful birth action on the premise that they have been injured by the birth of a disabled child.
Doing so would affirm and condone the parents’ professed choice to
have aborted the disabled fetus if they had been properly presented
with the opportunity.
Awarding parents damages for emotional distress in wrongful
birth suits stigmatizes disabled persons. Although recovery for emotional distress is permitted and is appropriate in other tort actions,
allowing it in wrongful birth actions sends the wrong message and is
not an appropriate remedy. In granting emotional damages to parents in a wrongful birth suit, “courts assume all parents will experience ‘emotional anguish’ caused by the ‘apparent’ complete trage172
dy of living with a child with a disability.”
Both causes of action,
173
and wrongful life in particular, seem to follow this same distasteful
logic. The irrebuttable presumption of the law, however, should be
that a parent loves his or her child unconditionally, regardless of the
state of that child’s health. Nevertheless, “[f]or all of this culture’s
talk about ‘unconditional love’ of children, its tolerance of them is
baldly conditional: It permits them to live on the condition that they
174
possess wanted traits.”
As the Michigan Court of Appeals indicated, “a child should not
175
Disabled persons are still
be considered a ‘harm’ to its parents.”
very capable of experiencing and providing love and affection to
176
their family and living “full” lives. Any damages awarded to parents
171
COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY 15 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
172
Macurdy, supra note 143, at 451.
173
See infra Part V.B.
174
Neumayr, supra note 37, at 2.
175
Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 681 (emphasis omitted). For this reason, the court refused to allow recovery even of “the customary cost of raising the child,” let alone an
award of emotional damages. Id. This Comment, while in line with the premise behind the Court of Appeals of Michigan decision, abstains from agreeing with the
court’s view that no such special damages should be awarded because the health care
system remains unable to address the financial needs of disabled children and their
families. See supra Part II.C.
176
See COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 171, at 54 (“[M]any people
with disabilities lead full and productive lives and that society’s negative view of disabilities is sometimes of greater harm to them than the disabilities themselves.” (cita-
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because they have been “harmed” by the birth of their disabled child
echoes in eugenics. A limited damage award would dispel those eugenic implications by ensuring that states are not legitimizing the
claim that parents are harmed for being forced to rear a disabled
177
child—their child.
B. Damages in Wrongful Life
The eugenic implications are stronger in wrongful life than in
wrongful birth suits. At least in wrongful birth there is a loss of opportunity—the lost opportunity to exercise one’s right to terminate a
pregnancy, which one cannot exercise without having all of the facts
on which to base a decision. One of the impetuses behind the physician’s duty to make full disclosure to the patient is a patient’s right of
self-determination whereby “‘it is the prerogative of the patient, not
the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his in178
terests seem to lie.’”
Thus, while the plaintiff-parent in wrongful
birth causes of action can, at least, claim the loss of a well-recognized
right, the plaintiff-child in wrongful life cases cannot, since there is
179
no recognized right not to be born.
Like the wrongful birth tort,
awards of damages in the wrongful life tort have eugenic implications
because the damages are awarded for having to live as a disabled person.
To award damages in wrongful life gives legitimacy to the claim,
“I should never have been born.” It reflects negatively on disabled
people to say that they have been damaged somehow or that they
have suffered a harm in having been born. To award a disabled child
damages for pain and suffering for having been born is evidence of
society’s inability to see value in the lives of people who have a disabil180
ity.
Disabled people have a history of being marginalized and deva181
lued in society. The legal system, by recognizing the wrongful life
(and wrongful birth) suit, draws a distinction between healthy child-

tion omitted)); see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 203 (“Some patients with
[late-onset] Huntington’s disease feel that the several healthy decades of life that
they have is what really matters.”).
177
See proposal infra Part VI.
178
Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 509 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
179
See Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978).
180
See Macurdy, supra note 143, at 450.
181
See id.
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ren and genetically disabled children; this furthers the marginalization and devaluation. These legal distinctions add fuel to the fire
outside the courtroom because such distinctions are “then advanced
to justify treating individuals with disabilities differently, [and] are as182
sumed to be natural ones, and, therefore, unquestionable.”
The
law thereby validates the disability hierarchy that society and parents
have created and makes abstention from conception or abortion of
fetuses with genetic impairments seem like the “right” thing to do
183
when exercising procreative autonomy. The state’s endorsement of
this disability hierarchy is a form of discrimination and results in eugenics.
The Supreme Court of California intimated that “a reverent appreciation of life compels recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she may be, has come into existence as a living person with
184
certain rights.”
Ironically, the plaintiff-child would not have such
rights if she was never conceived or if she was aborted. In Turpin,
California correctly denied the child’s claim for general damages, including pain and suffering, in part because “it is simply impossible to
determine in any rational or reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff
has in fact suffered an injury in being born impaired rather than not
185
being born [at all].” In a wrongful life case, the child did not suffer
the loss of “a life without hereditary elements” because this is some186
thing a genetically disabled child could never have.
The child
would claim that had the doctor not been negligent, his parents
would never have conceived, or if he had already been conceived, his
187
parents would have terminated the pregnancy. Thus the only conceivable injury to the plaintiff in wrongful life actions is the opportu188
nity to not be alive at all. What many jurisdictions fail to consider in
awarding general damages in wrongful life actions is that “the plaintiff has in fact obtained a physical existence with the capacity both to
receive and give love and pleasure as well as to experience pain and

182

Id. at 451.
See id.
184
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958 (Cal. 1982) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
185
Id. at 963.
186
Contra supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing prenatal-tort injuries
where the child, but for the physician’s negligence, could have been born a healthy
child).
187
See supra note 83–84 and accompanying text.
188
See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 964.
183
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189

suffering.” And thus, a disabled child’s pain and suffering may be
190
more than offset by the benefits of being alive in the world.
The recognition of wrongful birth and wrongful life claims is
similar in some respects to Germany’s compulsory sterilization laws,
which were enacted “for the prevention of progeny with hereditary
191
defects.”
The Nazis called a handicapped person a “‘[l]ife not
192
worth living.’” The Nazis conducted their 1930s eugenics program
by not only sterilizing undesirables but also killing about 150,000
mentally and physically disabled innocent people—people whom the
193
Nazi regime considered a burden on society. Granting damages in
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits relays a similar message—that
the birth of a disabled child has somehow damaged his parents and
constitutes an injury to the child because allegedly a life with a disa194
bility may be a life not worth living. While Americans would be appalled by a comparison of their modern society to that of the Nazis,
the pre-birth screening and subsequent enforcement of wrongful
birth and wrongful life actions evidences that some jurisdictions are
sliding back into a eugenic abyss and going down a somewhat similar
195
path as Hitler.
C. Summary
Because eugenics occurs when a public or private entity attempts
to improve or alter the physical or mental qualities of future generations, the courts’ current form of recognition of either of these causes of action is a “less open and more subtle” expression, but nonetheless an expression, of our “intolerance for those who don’t fit the
196
norm.”
By awarding damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life
suits to parents for their unwanted disabled child or awarding damages to the disabled children themselves, the government lends sup197
port to the claim that “‘disability is a fate worse than death.’”

189

Id.
Cf. id. (suggesting that pain and suffering “must be offset by the benefits incidentally conferred by the defendant’s conduct”).
191
McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 200 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192
Dreher, supra note 99, at 022.
193
Id.
194
See discussion supra note 102.
195
See id.
196
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 1.
197
Id. at 2.
190
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Contemporary attitudes indicate that despite recent efforts to
accommodate those with disabilities, society continues to be unac198
cepting of such individuals.
The Americans with Disabilities Act,
“arguably the most important civil rights legislation enacted in the
United States since the 1960s, reifies a national commitment to treat
199
disabled persons as equals.”
Society has witnessed increased concern for the well-being and rights of disabled persons in the past dec200
Yet society’s progressive movement of accommodation for
ades.
disabled persons has regressed to the point where society and the law
evidently indicate that a disabled person is better off not having been
born at all. This is not much different from saying that “‘a disabled
201
person is better off dead.’”
While it seems unlikely that statesupported sterilization programs will be revived against disabled
people in this country, eugenic thinking has nevertheless manifested
itself in the context of prenatal diagnosis and the recognition of
202
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims.
VI. MITIGATING THE EUGENIC IMPLICATIONS OF WRONGFUL BIRTH
AND WRONGFUL LIFE SUITS
Many states have replaced the eugenic sterilization programs of
the early twentieth century in the United States with eugenic abortions at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first
203
centuries. Obviously, the same state-directed eugenic programs of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—through which the legislatures were authorizing involuntary sterilizations—are not in place today, but the same values are equally present in this new “backdoor”
204
eugenics.
The eugenic implications can thus be mitigated by reevaluating the damages awards in wrongful birth and wrongful life
causes of action.
205
Society encourages responsible parenting. Some argue that so
long as reproductive decisions are left to “responsible” parents who
are trying to do what is best for their children and best for their fami-

198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

See Rosen, supra note 34.
Reilly, supra note 34, at 213.
See id.
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 2.
See Reilly, supra note 34, at 213.
See Neumayr, supra note 34, at 2.
See McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 203.
See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
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206

ly, eugenics is inevitable.
If the costs of a disabled child’s health
care are not covered by other means, then parents who learn that
they are going to have a child who will likely cost them substantially
more money than they expected may choose to terminate the pregnancy. But if parents are assured that their child will be taken care of
financially, they may choose to proceed with the pregnancy despite
the additional emotional anxiety that may accompany the rearing of a
207
disabled child. Furthermore, if adequate health care coverage were
available for disabled persons during both their childhood and
adulthood, huge damages awards in wrongful birth or wrongful life
causes of action would be unnecessary. Without those huge damages
awards against physicians looming over the horizon, physicians would
likely feel less inclined to engage in negative eugenics by recommending abortions and abstention from conception for “at risk”
couples.
Yet even with a proper health care system in place to address the
financial costs of living with a disability, the courts could and should
award nominal damages to parents in wrongful birth actions. Such
damages will act as proper acknowledgment of what the parent has
lost—the right to make an informed decision about whether to have
a child. Further, they may also serve to deter further negligent behavior. Most importantly, since awards of nominal damages will be con208
siderably less than awards for special damages and emotionaldistress damages, they will not incentivize doctors to excessively rec209
ommend abortions.

206

McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 203.
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
208
Typically, nominal damages are one dollar. 1 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES
IN TORT ACTIONS § 2.04 (2009). Some courts, however, have chosen not to limit
awards of nominal damages to one dollar and have let juries award plaintiffs as much
as $735 or $3000 as the circumstance of each case may dictate. Id.
209
Other positive effects of such a result include increased proportionality to the
level of culpability of the negligent physician, less of a windfall to the parents, and
elimination of what would otherwise be an unreasonable financial burden for prenatal-care physicians. Cf. Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 828 (Va. 1982) (discussing the drawbacks of larger awards to parents). Moreover, removing the extra potential for liability for doctors should lower their insurance premiums, the costs of which
would otherwise pass to the consumer-patient. This should increase access to prenatal-care physicians.
207
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A. Even Absent Legislative Action, These Torts Should Be Considered
by the Courts
There are competing interests in wrongful birth and wrongful
life claims—the interest of autonomy in procreative decision making
and the public’s interest in protecting disabled persons from discrimination and a new eugenic movement. Courts and legislatures have
tried to negotiate a line that provides remuneration to parents who
are saddled with the expenses of a disabled child but does not disparage the value of persons who are disabled. Some courts have felt
constrained from recognizing a particular cause of action without a
210
clear mandate from the legislature. But this self-imposed constraint
is unwarranted. Courts that have refused to recognize a cause of action because of a dearth of legislative authority are mistaken because
wrongful birth and wrongful life are negligence torts, which is a
211
common-law doctrine. As such, the determination of the scope of
212
this doctrine is within the province of the courts. Courts need not
defer to state legislatures to decide to what extent these causes of ac213
tion should be recognized. Moreover, courts should not wait for the
legislature to resolve the issue because in the interim of waiting for
legislative action there will be no resolution and no redress for those
persons clearly wronged by the negligence of prenatal-care physi214
cians.
B. Issues in Line Drawing
The legal challenge is where to draw the line to balance the interest of “social obligations [to prevent a new eugenic era, in this
case,] as against individual rights, and reproductive freedom and pri215
vacy as against the requirements of public health and welfare.”
Some courts have decided to tackle the difficulty of whether to recognize these causes of action and, in so doing, have considered the

210

See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) (“Recognition of
so novel a cause of action requiring, as it must, creation of a hypothetical formula for
the measurement of an infant’s damages is best reserved for legislative, rather than
judicial, attention.” (citations omitted)).
211
Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 829.
212
Id.; see also Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696
(E.D. Pa. 1978).
213
Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 829.
214
See Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., C.A. No. 98-2076, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 116, at
*8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1999).
215
ENGS, supra note 105, at xvi–xvii.
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216

relevant aspects of public policy.
But with very few exceptions,
these courts have not touched on the eugenic implications of recog217
nizing these causes of action.
The judiciary and the legislatures
should focus on these implications for the sake of public policy.
While this Comment focuses on the impact that the recognition
of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits has on the disabled community, the arguments herein can also be extended to some extent to
other types of discrimination, such as sex discrimination. For instance, perhaps in the future, parents who were seeking to have a boy
and were told that they were having a boy but, in fact, had a girl will
218
want to have the right to sue their doctor for wrongful birth. The
question about whether the state has a sufficiently compelling interest to prevent discrimination and a new eugenic movement against
the genetically disabled is related to the question of whether a state’s
219
interest in preventing a sexual imbalance in the population or
220
gender bias is sufficiently compelling to either warrant interference
221
with the constitutional right to decide whether to conceive and

216

See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. 1978) (noting that any
resolution of the wrongful life cause of action debate must consider public policy).
217
For those courts that have touched on this issue, see supra notes 165–167 and
accompanying text.
218
See ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 33, at 362. This may be a concern because
“[b]oth prenatal testing during gestation and in vitro analysis of preimplantation
embryos identify the sex of the fetus in most cases, thus creating the possibility of aborting fetuses of the undesired sex.” The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 634.
219
See McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 203 (“In several developing nations amniocentesis is used to determine the sex of the fetus, with the goal of terminating
unwanted females. This has resulted in skewed sex ratios in India and China, just
one example of what can happen if genetic testing and reproductive technologies
are utilized in unregulated or poorly structured ways.”); see also Reilly, supra note 34,
at 212–13 (“[T]here are states in India and provinces in China where it is relatively
common practice to use medical technology and selective abortion to avoid the
births of girls. This, together with the once not uncommon practice in China of denying lifesaving treatments to infant girls who are ill, has led to claims that as many as
100 million girls are missing from the Asian continent.”).
220
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 636 (“Sex selection is problematic because it implicitly fosters the value of one sex over the other, it
confirms that sex is a governing factor in human behavior, and it treats gender, a genetic trait, as a disease.” (footnotes omitted)).
221
Note that the governments of India and China have officially forbidden the use
of medical technology and selective abortion to prevent the births of girls. Reilly,
supra note 34, at 212–13.
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raise a child or limit the application of wrongful birth and wrongful
222
life suits.
The Supreme Court intimated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that
without Roe’s recognition of the woman’s interest in procreative
choice, the government “might as readily restrict a woman’s right to
choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for exam223
ple.” The state should have a sufficiently compelling interest in preventing a new eugenic movement directed against genetically disabled
people to warrant a reevaluation of the judicial and legislative roles in
224
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.
When will parents . . . be allowed to decide that their child is so
‘defective’ that given a chance they would have aborted it while
still a fetus and, as a result, then be allowed to hold their physi-

222

The Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks of the Institute of Medicine would
think so. “The committee felt strongly that the use of fetal diagnosis for determination of fetal sex and the subsequent use of abortion for the purpose of preferential
selection of the sex of the fetus represents a misuse of genetic services that is inappropriate and should be discouraged.” COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra
note 171, at 8. The Committee also intimated that “reproductive genetic services
should not be used to pursue eugenic goals,” id., and it recommended that “prenatal
diagnosis not be used for minor conditions or characteristics.” Id. at 105. The American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs also wants to limit
the use of prenatal screening to serious conditions:
[A]bortion or discard [of embryos] based on non-disease-related traits
would be inappropriate. Selective practices, such as sex selection, may
result in lasting social harms . . . . Recognizing the potential for social
harms, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research strongly discouraged the use of prenatal testing for sex selection . . . .
Selection to avoid genetic disorders would not always be appropriate. Abortion because of genetic disease is most understandable when
the disease would have serious manifestations, such as with Tay-Sachs
disease or Huntington’s chorea. Conversely, selection becomes more
problematic as the effects of the disease become milder and as they become manifest later in life.
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 638–39 (footnotes omitted). Thus, if such guidelines prove effective and parents are not entitled to prenatal
screening for sex or minor conditions, then wrongful birth and wrongful life suits
would not be available to them.
223
505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992).
224
Interestingly, while China has prohibited prenatal sex selection, see supra note
221, in 1994, China enacted a Maternal and Infant Health Care Law, which contains
“language [that] has been interpreted to require sterilization or the monitored use
of long-term contraception as a precondition of marriage if a person is determined
by a doctor to be at risk for parenting [disabled] children.” Reilly, supra note 34, at
213.
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cian civilly liable? When a fetus is only the carrier of a deliterious
[sic] gene and not itself impaired? . . . Should such issues be left
exclusively to the parents with doctors being found liable for
breaching their duty to inform parents of any fetal conditions to
225
which they know or should know the parents may object?

While courts think they need to grapple with such questions, the discussion may be moot. Although eighty-nine percent of Americans
would support prenatal screening for severe genetic diseases, most
Americans would not support genetic testing for minor defects or
226
cosmetic reasons.
C. Drawing the Line Without Health Care Reform
Even without sufficient health care coverage for disabled persons
and their families, the eugenic implications of recognizing wrongful
birth and wrongful life suits can be mitigated by reevaluating the
damages that are awarded. In wrongful birth actions, the damages
that may be awarded should be limited to (i) general damages for
emotional suffering only where the child suffers from an imminently
fatal disease and (ii) special damages—damages in the amount of
medical and hospital expenses incurred in connection with the birth
and rearing of the child that are in excess of what the costs would have
227
been to the parents if the child had been healthy. In addition, spe225

Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1985).
ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 57. Some, however, go a step further and argue
that the State should interfere in a parent’s procreative autonomy to make sure that
severely disabled children are not born:
[Parents’] freedom of decision in this area should have presumptive
priority in our moral and legal thinking. Only in extreme cases are we
warranted as a society in denying them access to the professional services they need to realize their choices or in preventing them from exercising those choices. These extreme cases are characterized by the
following two features: (1) the likelihood that, relative to others in the
birth cohort, the child will experience significant pain, disability or limitations in life options as a result of avoidable genetic factors; and (2)
the parents’ reasons for bringing the child into the world in this condition do not constitute reasonable or compelling grounds for respecting
their choice.
Ronald M. Green, Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm One’s Child Genetically, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 13 (1997) (footnote omitted).
227
The special damages should be granted only in the amount that exceeds the
cost of a normal birth or rearing of a healthy child because in wrongful birth actions,
parents do not allege lost opportunity to choose not to have a child at all but instead
allege lost opportunity to choose not to have this disabled child. It should be noted
that in wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy actions, most courts do not allow parents to recover the costs incurred in raising a normal, healthy child to majori226
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cial damages could and ought to be awarded in wrongful birth and
wrongful life causes of action for the costs of living with the disability
once the child reaches majority. In wrongful life, if costs of living with the
disability through the age of minority were not already recovered by
the parents in a wrongful birth suit, then these should also be
awarded in the wrongful life suit.
1.

Special Damages Should Be Awarded in Both Wrongful
Birth and Wrongful Life

Since health care in the United States is still far from adequate,
courts should continue to award special damages in wrongful birth
and wrongful life causes of action to compensate the disabled child
during both the age of minority and majority. In the interest of fairness, these onerous expenses should be recovered by the parents who
may have wanted to abort the child for no other reason than the fact
they could not afford a child with a disability. Therefore, absent sufficient health care reform, courts and state legislatures should adhere
to good public policy and follow such jurisdictions as California and
New Jersey in awarding special damages to parents and the children
themselves for the costs of living with their disability beyond the age
of minority, i.e., throughout their lives.
Because health coverage for disabled persons still remains largely inadequate, it is not surprising that parents sue in wrongful birth,
seeking special damages for the substantial costs incurred in caring
228
for a disabled child.
“Some courts have been willing to overlook
[the eugenics] problem in search of [financial] support for a disabled plaintiff when adequate support for medical expenses is not
229
otherwise available.”
The rationale that courts have used to allow
special damages is premised on “the conclusion that the mother
ty. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Morris v.
Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 188 (Okla. 1987). The premise behind this disallowance is
that “whatever damage plaintiffs suffered was more than offset by the benefit to them
of having a healthy child.” Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971). This is called the “benefits rule.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920
(1979). The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the benefits rule is inapplicable
in a wrongful conception case because “the value of the life of a child will always
outweigh the customary cost of raising that child to majority.” Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at
681 (citing Rouse v. Wesley, 494 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)). The court also
intimated that it would have the same presumption of value of the child’s life in
wrongful birth cases, as well, because it would not “endorse the view that the life of a
disabled child is worth less than the life of a healthy child.” Id.
228
See supra notes 53–61 and accompanying text.
229
Botkin, supra note 30, at 273 (footnote omitted).
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would have aborted the fetus and would thus not have had to en230
counter these expenses.” The courts that have recognized wrongful
life claims have limited the damages awards to special damages for
the same rationale. For instance, California sought to follow what it
considered to be good public policy in alleviating one’s financial
231
burdens, and New Jersey, in recognizing the wrongful life tort,
sought to “respond to the call of the living for help in bearing the
232
Thus, a court’s impetus behind an
burden of their affliction.”
award of special damages is “not premised on the concept that nonlife is preferable to an impaired life, but is predicated on the needs of
233
the living.” Courts will continue to feel this pressure so long as the
uninsured and underinsured lack a sufficiently comprehensive health
care program to help parents raise their disabled children or the ge234
netically disabled to live comfortably with their disabilities. The legislature is in a far better position to remedy this issue because the legislature can create a better health care system for disabled persons
and their families. Such state action has “substantial influence over
whether children with conditions . . . have health coverage and how
adequate that coverage will be to meet their care and treatment
235
needs.”
Absent adequate health care, however, special damages for the
additional medical and care expenses to be incurred by the parents
during their child’s age of minority should be awarded to parents in a
wrongful birth action. The court must identify and compensate for
236
only those damages “that flow from the denial of parental choice.”
If damages could be awarded on the basis of loss of parental invest237
ment, then this Comment would propose it, but such a calculation
would likely be far too subjective. A damages award to parents that is
limited to special damages should act as sufficient deterrence to phy-

230

Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 284 (2005).
231
See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982).
232
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984), remanded to 502 A.2d 94 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 543 A.2d 985, 996 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988) (dismissing only plaintiff’s legal malpractice count against certain
defendants).
233
Id.
234
Botkin, supra note 30, at 273–74.
235
AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 421.
236
See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 770 (Handler, J., dissenting).
237
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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sicians while simultaneously addressing and mitigating the eugenic
concerns implicit in recognizing the wrongful birth suit.
Of course, large damages awards for the extra costs incurred by
caring for a child with a particular disability may breed unfairness
among parents similarly situated and is something that should be remedied by each state legislature. The unfairness results when the
costs of raising a disabled child are awarded to one set of parents who
maintain that they never would have conceived or would have aborted the child had they had the opportunity but are not awarded to
parents who had a meaningful opportunity to make a decision and
decided to proceed with the pregnancy—both sets of parents are still
similarly burdened with heavy financial costs. Again, this imbalance
would be remedied with a proper health care system, which would
cover the necessary costs for parents in either situation.
Because it is illogical and unfair to permit only the parents to recover the medical costs of the disabled child’s care and not the child,
wrongful life actions should also be permitted so long as the health
care system remains inadequate. This will ensure that the disabled
child may recover the expenses of his or her medical care upon
238
reaching majority. After all, the child’s medical and other expenses
related to his or her disability do not disappear when the child reach239
es adulthood. If the costs of medical care and other additional expenses are recovered by the parents in a wrongful birth suit, such
costs, of course, should not be recovered a second time by the child
240
in a wrongful life suit; if the parents made such a recovery in a
wrongful birth suit, the child, therefore, should only recover special
damages limited to costs incurred during his or her adulthood
241
through a wrongful life suit.
2.

A General Bar on Damages for Emotional Distress

Generally, damages should not be granted for emotional distress
to either parents or the disabled child as a proximate result of the
prenatal-care physician’s negligence in either wrongful birth or
wrongful life causes of action. This should be the rule even though
“caring for children with severe disorders is often psychologically

238

See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983); see also Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762.
239
Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495.
240
Id.
241
Id.; see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958–59 (Cal. 1982).
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242

draining on parents.”
Prohibiting damages for emotional distress
would help mitigate the eugenic implications underlying a court’s
recognition that a parent has been harmed by the birth of a disabled
child. Further, awarding any damages to an infant plaintiff for pain
and suffering in a wrongful life claim is, in fact, eugenics; general
damages, therefore, should not be awarded to a plaintiff in either
suit.
A court affirms the notion that disabled children constitute
harm to their parents when it holds that parents who gave birth to a
disabled child are consequently emotionally damaged and not merely
economically injured. One of the purposes in awarding damages in
tort actions is to “give compensation, indemnity or restitution for
243
harms.” As a result, awarding damages indicates that someone has
been harmed. Because harms should generally be prevented, awarding damages is akin to judiciaries holding that the birth of these
children should have been prevented. This is a eugenic goal—
seeking to prevent the birth of the unfit and to encourage the
“[d]eliberate manipulation of reproduction with the purpose of
244
creating superior offspring.”
The Supreme Court of Washington’s decision in Harbeson v.
245
Parke-Davis is a great example of how a court may choose to consider a disabled child to be a harm to his parents. The court asked, “Are
these developments [in medical science] the first steps towards a
Fascist-Orwellian societal attitude of genetic purity, or Huxley’s brave
new world? Or do they provide positive benefits to individual families
and to all society by avoiding the vast emotional and economic cost of
246
defective children?” The court then chose to engage in eugenics by
forthwith choosing to “recognize the benefits of these medical developments” and holding that “parents have a right to prevent the birth
247
of a defective child.”
The court also indicated that the legislature
had previously adopted a policy to compensate a parent not only for
248
economic losses but also for emotional distress. Then the court intimated that “[t]here appears to be no compelling reason that policy
242

The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 635.
1 NATES ET AL., supra note 208, § 1.01, at ¶ 2 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 901 (1979)).
244
BEYER & REDDEN, supra note 1, at 297.
245
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
246
Id. at 491 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
247
Id.
248
See id. at 493.
243
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should not apply in wrongful birth actions.”
Clearly, the court
failed to perceive how the prevention of eugenics could be that compelling reason.
Tort law limits recovery for mental distress to those cases where a
250
plaintiff suffers a legally cognizable harm.
Since no cognizable
harm has actually taken place in wrongful birth suits (except in cases
where a parent has to watch his or her child die due to the congenital
251
disorder), no recovery for emotional distress should be allowed in
wrongful birth actions. Arguably, the parent who was denied the opportunity to choose because the treating physician did not sufficiently
252
inform the parent “suffers from the very harm not warned against.”
This statement implies that the harm that physicians fail to warn
against in wrongful birth cases is the “harm” of having a child with a
disability. The court is making a value judgment by legally recognizing that parents who have a child with a disability are emotionally
harmed while parents who have a healthy child are not (even if these
latter parents did not want a child at all). “A court has no business
declaring that among the living are people who never should have
253
been born.”
3.

Exception: Damages for Emotional Distress Should Be
Awarded to Parents in Cases of Imminently Fatal
Disease

In recognizing the harm and emotional distress that a parent has
to endure in watching one’s child die, this Comment proposes that
an exception be made in certain wrongful birth cases. The emotional
distress damages that should be permitted in wrongful birth actions
are not meant to redress the emotional distress suffered by parents in
having a disabled child they did not want. Rather, they are meant to
redress the emotional distress that parents will suffer as bystanders—
the emotional distress that results from having to watch one’s child
die.
This approach is synonymous with jurisdictions that have rejected the zone-of-danger limitation in bystander-recovery cases for
emotional distress and have instead adopted the Dillon rule of fore249

Id.
Berger & Twerski, supra note 230, at 285 n.137.
251
See infra Part VI.C.3.
252
Berger & Twerski, supra note 230, at 286.
253
Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
250
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254

seeability.
The various formulations of the Dillon rule among the
jurisdictions would require the following findings in a wrongful birth
suit: a family relationship, death to the child, serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff, and the death of the child being wit255
nessed by the parent.
Arguably, if the law permits an award of damages in cases of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, then it could
similarly extend this award to wrongful birth cases. To provide context for this issue, consider the following hypothetical: Amanda and
Aaron are recently married and want to have a child. Because they
are of Ashkenazi Jewish decent, they are aware of the increased like256
lihood that they could have a child with Tay-Sachs, which is characterized by, inter alia, loss of vision, mental underdevelopment, con257
vulsions, and a very reduced life span. They consult a geneticist to
determine whether either or both of them are carriers for this inheritable disease. The geneticist conducts the genetic tests and sends
them to the laboratory for testing. The lab technician, after working
eleven hours straight, accidentally switches Amanda’s sample with
someone else’s sample. This mistake causes the test results to indicate that Aaron is a carrier for the Tay-Sachs gene but not Amanda.
Accordingly, the couple decides to proceed to have a child. Amanda
conceives and gives birth to a child with Tay-Sachs. Further testing
reveals that Amanda is also a carrier of the genetic mutation, and the
258
parents file suit against the lab technician who was at fault.
If one of the foreseeable consequences of a physician’s negligence in failing to diagnose a fetus with Tay-Sachs disease (a fatal disease) is that the parents will have to watch their young child die, then
this is not necessarily distinguishable from a mother recovering dam-

254

See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 309 (2000).
See id.
256
Botkin, supra note 30, at 276.
257
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958 (Cal. 1982).
258
Cf. Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 827 (Va. 1982) (stating that because the
plaintiff-father’s sample to be tested for Tay-Sachs was mislabeled and mixed up with
another father’s sample, the plaintiff-father’s test results were incorrectly reported as
negative). In Naccash, the court decided to recognize the tort of wrongful birth in
Virginia and found the treating physician liable for the lab technician’s negligence
based upon a theory of respondeat superior and awarded the parents damages for
the costs of care and treatment of the disabled child, as well as damages for emotional distress. Id. at 827, 830–33. The court did not decide the issue of wrongful life in
Naccash. See id. Virginia, however, has refused to recognize a tort for wrongful life.
Barnes v. Head, 30 Va. Cir. 218, 221–22 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993).
255
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ages for the emotional distress she endured because a negligent driver fatally ran over her child in the street right in front of her. While
it is true that some parents, regrettably, will watch their children die
as a result of accidents and late-onset diseases, these scenarios are distinguishable from wrongful birth situations. The fact remains that
parents in the wrongful birth fact scenario suffer by reason of the
negligence of their prenatal-care physician. The underlying premise
in wrongful birth is that but for the physician’s negligence, these parents would not have to suffer through the death of their child. Thus,
parents should be allowed to recover for emotional distress in wrongful birth suits only where the genetic disease will cause the child to die at a
very young age. The rationale behind permitting an award of damages
for emotional distress where the child suffers from imminently fatal
conditions is that the emotional suffering clearly arises out of having
to watch one’s child die and less from the inconvenience and disap259
pointment of having to raise a disabled child.
To provide further context for this issue, consider these two additional scenarios:
In the first scenario, Carrie and Carl are having their first child.
They both have family members who have developed breast or ovarian cancer later on in life. Unbeknownst to them, genetic testing is
available for the genetic mutations of BRCA1 and BRCA2, each of
which have been connected with up to an eighty-five percent risk of
260
later development of breast or ovarian cancer. If the child is a girl
with either of these mutations, she will have this risk of developing
cancer, but a boy who is a carrier for either of these mutations can
261
transmit them to his own children.
Their prenatal-care physician,
unaware of the couple’s family history, neither discusses these risks
nor offers any testing of the fetus for these genetic mutations. The
couple has a healthy baby girl.

259

Furthermore, consideration must also be given to the concern that if the law
permits recovery to parents for emotional distress, what would stop parents from
suing for loss of consortium from each other. Claims for loss of consortium may be
too far removed to be considered within the realm of foreseeability. The only permissible form of emotional distress that should be recoverable in wrongful birth
claims is, as aforementioned, the distress in having to watch one’s child die at a
young age; emotional distress, such as emotional strain on the marriage relationship
that may ultimately result in the dissolution of a marriage, is too far removed from
the doctor’s negligence to be considered proximate. Prenatal doctors cannot be responsible for failed interpersonal relationships between married couples.
260
Botkin, supra note 30, at 267.
261
See id.
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Soon after the birth, Carrie and Carl are informed about the
possible inheritability of these genetic mutations that are linked to
breast or ovarian cancer. The couple is tested for the mutations.
They also have their newborn daughter tested. The results show that
both Carrie and Carl are carriers for one of the two mutations, and
their daughter also tests positive for that mutation. Carrie and Carl
dread the future prospect of having to watch their daughter suffer
with, and possibly die from, cancer. Carrie and Carl say that they
would have terminated the pregnancy had they been given the opportunity to test the fetus for this genetic mutation and the results
262
were positive.
In the second scenario, Dana missed her menstrual period and
consulted her obstetrician to determine whether she was pregnant.
After a urinalysis determined that Dana was not pregnant, the doctor
prescribed Provera to her to induce menstruation. He did not inform Dana about the potential side effects of the drug despite the
263
fact that the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR) contained warnings that
Provera could cause a fetus to suffer from congenital abnormalities,
inter alia, if the drug were ingested by a pregnant woman. A subsequent test indicated Dana was pregnant. After she expressed concern
to her doctor about any effects the drug could have had on her pregnancy, the doctor told her not to worry. Despite the warnings in the
264
PDR and other “maternal indicators,” such as spotting, Dana’s doc262

Cf. id. at 293 (“No cases have been brought as of yet to explicitly raise this issue
[of whether physicians must take a family history of cancer during prenatal care]. . . .
[T]here is a general consensus that BRCA1 / BRCA2 testing should not be offered in
the context of prenatal diagnosis.”).
263
PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 2010 (64th ed. 2009); see also Physician’s Desk Reference
Bookstore,
Physician’s
Desk
Reference
2010,
https://www.pdrbookstore.com/ProdDetails.asp?ID=9781563637483&PG=1&Type=B
L&PCS=PDR (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) (stating that the PDR, which is now in its sixty-fourth edition, “provides the most accurate FDA-regulated information on more
than 2,400 prescription drugs”).
264
Maternal indicators are risk factors that act as red flags that indicate to the
prenatal-care physician that he should disclose a risk to his patient:
Accepted maternal indicators include exposure to drugs, irradiation,
or infection; diabetes, mental retardation, or PKU; a familial pattern of
inherited disorders; metabolic or biochemical disorders; known or
suspected chromosomal abnormalities; multiple miscarriages or still
births; infertility; consanguinity or incest; previous child with any kind
of genetic abnormality; age over 35; possession of a recessive gene; and
membership in an ethnic group at risk for a certain defect (i.e., African-Americans and sickle cell anemia; Ashkenazi Jews and Tay Sachs
Syndrome).
Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 816 n.5 (N.J. 1999).
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tor did not apprise her of the availability of certain diagnostic tests
nor administer such tests during her pregnancy. Dana gave birth to a
265
son with bilateral limb reduction.
In both of these scenarios, damages for emotional distress
should not be granted because the parents will not necessarily have to
watch their child die. Opponents may argue that drawing the line in
this manner is arbitrary and that the law is ill-equipped to make such
determinations. This argument, however, is unpersuasive due to the
fact that the law draws lines all the time. The line here would be
drawn at those children who are born with fatal diseases—such as
Tay-Sachs (for which no treatment is yet available, and even with the
266
best care, infected children die by age four) and polycystic kidney
disease (also untreatable and incurable “and often causes significant
267
mortality in the first month of life”).
Deaf children and children
265

In a similar case, the Supreme Court of California recognized a tort for wrongful life but refused to award general damages to the plaintiff-child for pain and suffering—even if the plaintiff’s condition would have been more serious than deafness,
the court indicated that it would not grant such an award. Turpin v. Sortini, 643
P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982) (“In this case, in which the plaintiff’s only affliction is
deafness, it seems quite unlikely that a jury would ever conclude that life with such a
condition is worse than not being born at all.”). The court, however, did permit an
award to the plaintiff-child for special damages to recover “the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat the hereditary ailment.” Id. at 966.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey permitted a wrongful birth action to go forward for the parents of a child who was born with bilateral limb reduction, which is
arguably not a severe disorder. Canesi, 730 A.2d at 810. New Jersey frames the
wrongful birth issue not in terms of serious defects but any birth defects: “The violation of the interest in self-determination that undergirds a wrongful birth cause of
action consists of the parents’ lost opportunity to make the personal decision of
whether or not to give birth to a child who might have birth defects.” Id. (citation
omitted). The damages that are recoverable in wrongful life claims (as well as
wrongful birth claims) “consist of the medical expenses attributable to the child’s
birth defects.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, presumably, if the medical expenses attributable to the defect in a wrongful birth or wrongful
life suit are insignificant, then the award will reflect that fact in those jurisdictions
(like New Jersey) that would permit suits for minor defects. Note that the court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the wrongful life claim because the “plaintiffs presented insufficient proof of a causal relationship between the
drug and the defect that afflicts their son.” Id. at 814.
266
Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders, Tay-Sachs Disease Information Page,
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm (last visited Mar. 21,
2010).
267
PKD
Found.,
About
PKD,
http://www.pkdcure.org/AboutPKD/
AboutPKDPage/tabid/869/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2010); see also Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809 (N.Y. 1978) (noting that the parents’ first child affected with PKD died five hours after birth and second child died at the age of two
and a half).
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with bilateral limb reduction or late-onset diseases would not fall into
268
this carve-out for damages for emotional distress.
D. Drawing the Line Under an Adequate Health Care System: In Lieu
of Special Damages, Nominal Damages Should Be Awarded to
Parents in Wrongful Birth
If a proper health care system were in place, the need for wrongful life actions would dissipate, and only awards to parents for nominal damages would be necessary in the wrongful birth cause of action.
The Scots’ legal concept of damnum is instructive here since it necessitates the recognition of wrongful birth actions even if a proper
269
health care system were in place. Damnum is “the deprivation of an
270
interest that the law recognizes as a legal interest.”
The invasion of
271
a legal right and the loss that results is called injuria.
Here, the injuria is “the failure to advise that the fetus is unhealthy and, by extension, to imply that termination is not indicated; the damnum lies in
being deprived of a legal right—that is, a[n] . . . opportunity for ter272
mination of a pregnancy.”
Thus, a parent clearly loses something
and suffers an injury by being deprived of her ability to exercise her
constitutionally protected right to choose.
As long as the law protects a woman’s right to choose whether to
have an abortion and also recognizes parents’ autonomy in deciding
273
what type of child they want to raise, then parents should be able to
sue physicians for their negligence in either not conducting or negligently conducting appropriate genetic testing, resulting in the par274
ents’ lost opportunity to make an informed decision. “If the moth268

See supra note 265.
J.K. MASON, THE TROUBLED PREGNANCY: LEGAL WRONGS AND RIGHTS IN
REPRODUCTION 86 (2007).
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
The Constitution provides,
Parents . . . have a liberty interest in the type of children that they
conceive and raise. In U.S. Supreme Court cases involving childrearing decisions, the Court has held that the determination of a
child’s social traits is a matter for the parents to decide (even if state
control arguably could produce a better child). A strong argument
similarly could be made that a child’s genetic traits should be determined by the parents rather than the state.
Andrews, supra note 35, at 999 (footnote omitted).
274
See Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., C.A. No. 98-2076, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 116, at
*9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1999) (“For those who can accept that abortion is a legal
269
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er was . . . entitled to have her pregnancy terminated, and if she
would have exercised that right, but was deprived of the opportunity
to do so as a result of clinical negligence, those facts should found a
275
sufficient foundation for her claim.”
To establish a cause of action in negligence, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant breached a legal duty that the defendant
owed to the plaintiff, which caused the plaintiff to suffer a direct in276
jury. In the typical wrongful birth case, the physician has breached
277
the duty of reasonable care that he owed to the parents. This duty
necessarily includes the duty to inform the parents of certain genetic
risks and the obligation to provide parents with reasonably accurate
and complete information with which the parents could make an in278
formed decision regarding procreative choice. The right to have an
abortion would be meaningless without sufficient information to
make such a decision. The breach occurs, for example, when lab
tests are negligently mislabeled or test results are negligently inter279
preted incorrectly. When this breach causes parents to make a decision to continue with a pregnancy rather than abstain from conception or have an abortion, as the case may be, the third element is
280
satisfied.
The parents have an actionable injury in that the physician’s breach of his duty to the parents deprived the parents of the
opportunity to exercise their procreative choice—their right to
281
282
choose. This is the direct injury in wrongful birth.
283
Injury is distinct from damages.
“Injury” is the violation of
some legal right, whereas “damage” is the harm sustained as a result
284
“Damages,” plural, refers to the amount awarded to
of the injury.

choice for pregnant parents at pertinent times, there is no difficulty in finding room
in the common law tort of negligence for claims of wrongful birth.”).
275
MASON, supra note 269, at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted).
276
Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 829 (Va. 1982).
277
Id.; cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash. 1983) (holding
that the duty of a physician to provide sufficient information to parents during prenatal care is that of due care).
278
Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 829; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 487–88 (“The parents’ right to
prevent a defective child and the correlative duty flowing from that right [to preserve
that right] is the heart of the wrongful birth action.”).
279
See, e.g., Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 829.
280
See id.
281
Id. at 829–30.
282
Id. at 830.
283
1 NATES ET AL., supra note 208, § 1.01.
284
Id.
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compensate for this harm. Generally, when the injury produces no
286
damage (injuria sine damno) there is no cause of action in tort.
There is an exception to this rule, however. Nominal damages may
still be awarded where the commission of a wrong causes an injury
287
but no actual damage or harm has been sustained by the victim.
While a plaintiff may indeed suffer some anguish from being deprived of her meaningful choice to have or not have the child (and
such emotional distress is related to the conduct of the physician re288
sponsible for the deprivation), the emotional hurt and anguish that
a parent suffers for having lost the opportunity to choose is nevertheless an injury that does not result in any real damage to the parent.
Parents have been economically harmed when they have a disabled child that they could have and would have aborted but for the
physician’s negligence. This economic harm, though, is the direct
result of the state’s failure to properly enact adequate health care legislation. If the parents could recover the extra costs of caring for the
disabled child during his or her minority, and the child could recover
the same once the age of majority is reached, then neither party
would suffer economic harm or loss as a result of the defendant’s
negligence. Thus, until proper health care is provided for disabled
persons, courts would be wrong to turn a blind eye to the economic
harm that has been caused by the negligent prenatal-care physician.
Even in cases where there is no need to award economic damages,
courts should still award nominal damages to vindicate the violation
of the parents’ right to choose. This award of nominal damages
would serve the purpose of acknowledging that there was an infrac289
tion of the parents’ rights and that the doctor committed a wrong.
Despite the utility of nominal damages, several jurisdictions have
refused to award nominal damages in negligence cases where the in290
jury is a technical one and no actual loss resulted.
These jurisdictions maintain that “[i]n a negligence action the right to be protected is the right not to be injured, if one is not actually injured no
291
right has been infringed upon.”
This argument, however, can be
applied in wrongful birth suits to bar nominal damages because the
285
286
287
288
289
290
291

Id.
Id.
Id.
Berger & Twerski, supra note 230, at 285.
Cf. 1 NATES ET AL., supra note 208, § 2.01.
See id. § 2.03.
Id.
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deprivation of the free exercise of one’s right to choose is the true injury in such cases. The issue is the difficulty in finding that someone
has been damaged as a result of that injury. Some jurisdictions do allow an award of nominal damages in negligence cases when “the dispute is not as to the fact of injury, but rather to the extent of that in292
jury or difficulty in proving the damage caused thereby.”
Courts
should follow this latter form of reasoning and grant nominal damages to parents in wrongful birth suits, thereby striking the proper
balance between individual interests in reproductive freedom and society’s obligations to protect the disabled population from a new eugenic movement.
E. Summary
Although some courts are hesitant to recognize either the
wrongful birth or wrongful life tort without a clear mandate from the
legislature, the judiciary is well equipped to make such a decision
without legislative guidance. While drawing the line in these causes
of action can be difficult, it should still be done to thwart this new
backdoor eugenic movement. The eugenic implications of wrongful
birth and wrongful life causes of action can be best impeded through
the enactment of proper health care legislation that would cover the
costs of living with a disability through a person’s childhood and
adulthood. If there were coverage, there would no longer be a need
for the wrongful life suit at all and only nominal damages would need
to be awarded in a wrongful birth suit to parents in recognition of
their lost opportunity to exercise their reproductive liberty. Yet even
without such health care reform, the eugenic implications can be mitigated by barring damages awards for emotional distress damages
except in cases of fatal disabilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
While there is a constitutional right to choose to terminate a
particular pregnancy, each and every state should consider the eugenic implications in recognizing wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims. If state or federal legislatures continue to avoid addressing
the inadequacy of the health care system for disabled children and
adults, parents should have the legal right to recover the costs of rearing disabled children through wrongful birth claims and children
should have the legal right to recover the costs that they will incur af292

Id.
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ter they reach the age of majority through wrongful life claims. The
recovery of these costs is better public policy than the alternative—
i.e., saddling parents who tried to engage in responsible parenting
with the huge financial burden of rearing a disabled child. Until legislatures redress the inadequacies of the current health care system
for the disabled, both wrongful birth and wrongful life suits should
be allowed and special damages should be permitted. Further, a limited damages award for emotional distress may be permitted in
wrongful birth suits only in cases where the parents have to suffer by
watching their child die at a young age.
This approach is not the best solution because the recognition
of these lawsuits stigmatizes the disabled community, legitimizes parental biases, and will likely encourage doctors to err on the side of
recommending abortions to avoid potential lawsuits—thus throwing
the eugenic movement into full throttle. It also leaves both the parents, who, after being properly informed of the risks of having a genetically disabled child, chose to proceed with the pregnancy, and
the child himself without means of compensation for their similarly
extraordinary and burdensome costs. These problems can be remedied if the legislatures correct the inadequacies of the health care system. The doctors’ incentive to recommend abortions will largely be
removed if the lawsuits are rendered unnecessary by a health care system that allows both parents and child to recover the full costs of caring for their disabled child and living a life with a disability. Moreover, the government will have removed itself from legitimizing the
discriminatory practices in which parents engage while making reproductive decisions. The government can still acknowledge any deprivation of the parents’ right to choose arising out of the negligence
of the physician by awarding nominal damages. This result achieves
the best balance between the interests of procreative autonomy and
closing the door to the government’s participation in this new eugenics movement.

